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PUT A REIN ON THAT UNRULY HORSE:
BALANCING THE FREEDOM OF
COMMERCIAL SPEECH AND THE
PROTECTION OF CHILDREN IN
RESTRICTING CIGARETTE BILLBOARD
ADVERTISING
Children have a very special place in life which law should
reflect. Legal theories and their phrasing in other cases readily
lead to fallacious reasoning if uncritically transferred to
determination of a State's duty towards children.'
-Justice Frankfurter
INTRODUCTION
The Marlboro man galloping on his glamorous range; Joe Camel,
a jovial cartoon character, driving a slick race car and wearing hip
Ray-Bans; and the Virginia Slims gals portraying the image that
smoking makes women thin and sexy.2 These billboard images of
1. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 536 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (emphasis
added).
2. The attractive and healthy images mask the chilling fact that advertising models have
suffered from smoking-related health problems. For instance, several of the original Marlboro
men have since died of smoking-related cancer. See Janine di Giovanni, Cancer Country;
Who's Lucky Now?, SUNDAY TIMES (London), Aug. 2, 1992, at 12. David Millar, Jr., the
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independence, healthiness, and romance are frequent scenes in
American cities. However, concern about the luring effect of
powerful images on teenagers has prompted 3 urban planners to limit
or even ban cigarette billboards to prevent a "teen epidemic" of
smoking.' Yet, urban planners who have attempted such measures are
original rugged Marlboro man of the 1950s, died of emphysema in 1987. See id. Wayne
McLaren, who posed for Marlboro Man print advertisements in the 1970s died of emphysema
in 1992. See id. Most recently the famous TV Marlboro Man of the 1970s died of lung cancer in
1995. See Ammonia Country, STAR-LEDGER (NEWARK), Oct. 30, 1995, at B1. Moreover, Will
Thombury, who posed as the "I'd walk a mile for a Camel" model, died from lung cancer in
1992. See di Giovanni, supra, at 12. Janet Sackman, who posed as Lucky Strike Girl, suffered
throat cancer in 1982. See id. Ironically, later in their lives, many of the cigarette advertising
models actively campaigned against smoking. See id.
3. Studies have found that the attractive images used in cigarette advertisements, appeal
to adolescents' psychological desire for independence and romance. See, e.g., Hooked on
Tobacco: The Teen Epidemic, 60 CONSUMER REPS. 142, 143 (1995) [hereinafter Hooked on
Tobacco]. In 1991, University of Georgia researcher Paul Fischer concluded that almost one-
third of three-year-olds and 91% of six-year-olds could match the Joe Camel cartoon character
with the cigarette that RJ. Reynolds promoted. See id. at 144. Moreover, Joseph DiFranza, a
physician at the University of Massachusetts, found that almost 98% of high-school students
recognized the Joe Camel character, versus 72% of adults. See id. Furthermore, teenagers who
could name a favorite cigarette advertisement, such as the Joe Camel cartoon, or who owned a
Marlboro T-shirt were found to be nearly four times as likely to start smoking than youngsters
who were not influenced by the marketing campaigns. See Dolores Kong, Studies Link Tobacco
Marketing to Smoking Among the Young, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 18, 1995, at 10. In addition,
John P. Pierce, director of the University of Califoria, San Diego cancer and control program,
linked tobacco marketing campaigns between 1890 and 1977 to subsequent increases in teenage
smoking. See id.
4. See Hooked on Tobacco, supra note 3, at 142. Research indicates that the number of
adult smokers in the United States has declined in the past three decades, but this decline has
leveled offwith a steady increase in the number of teenage smokers. See id. In 1989, American
children under 18 purchased almost one billion packs of cigarettes. See William J. Bailey &
James W. Crowe, A National Survey of Public Support for Restrictions on Youth Access to
Tobacco, 64 J. SCH. HEALTH 314 (1994). More than one million Americans start smoking
cigarettes each year (about 3,000 people every day), at least 75% are children under the age of
18. See id. In addition, according to the 1995 University of Michigan Survey Research Center
Report, roughly 31% of high school seniors smoke, and of the 3,000 children who begin
smoking each day, 1,000 will one day die of a tobacco-related disease. See Shari Roan, The
Lesser Evil?, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1995, at El.
In an effort to curb the rising tide of underage smoking, more cities are trying to regulate
outdoor cigarette advertising. Baltimore initiated this trend in 1993 by banning cigarette
advertisements on billboards and sides of buildings. See infra note 16 for the content of the
Baltimore city ordinance. In 1994, the City Council of Cincinnati passed an ordinance, which
became effective on June 1, 1996, banning any cigarette advertisement on "any outdoor
advertising sign" in Cincinnati. See Ben L. Kaufman, City Ban on Tobacco Ads Prompts Suits,
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being challenged for impeding the First Amendment's5 guarantee of
free commercial speech.'
In a parallel proposal to the local cigarette outdoor advertising
ban, in August 1995 President Clinton suggested comprehensive
executive actions to curb the advertising, promotion, and sale of
cigarettes to teenagers by expanding the rulemaking authority of the
Food and Drug Administration.' This proposal prohibits outdoor
CIN. ENQUIRER, July 7, 1995, at C2. The Cincinnati ordinance also provides serious penalties
for violations: a $100 fine and 30 days in jail for the first offense; a $1,000 fine and forfeiture of
the billboard for the second offense; each day's violation to be counted as a separate offense.
See id. As of 1994, the New York City Metropolitan Transit Authority prohibits cigarette
advertising on subway stations, subways, buses, bus stops, and train stations. See Daniel E.
Troy, City Ordinances Banning Tobacco and Alcohol Advertising Are Unconstitutional, LEGAL
OPINION LETTER, (Wash. Legal Found., Washington, D.C.), July 29, 1994. In 1995,
Washington, D.C. proposed a cigarette advertising ban similar to the Cincinnati ordinance. See
Kristan Metzler, Targeting Temptation: Sign Ban Hits Allure of Alcohol and Tobacco, WASH.
TIMES, Nov. 20, 1995, at C5. Also in 1995, the Board of Supervisors of San Francisco
introduced a city ordinance banning cigarette advertising within 1,500 feet of parks, recreation
centers, churches, schools, and other sites. See Michael Wilke, Outdoor Biz Urged to Join Ad-
Limit Fight: Tobacco Is No. 2 Category, ADVERTISING AGE, Nov. 6, 1995, at 8. Other cities
that have enacted or proposed ordinances banning cigarette billboard advertising include
Amherst, Massachusetts; Preston, Minnesota; and Wauhesha, Wisconsin. See, e.g., Metzler,
supra; Pay Doyle, The Great Smoking Debate; Ban on Tobacco Ads, Although Overturned,
Puts Preston on Map, STAR TRIt. (Minneapolis-St. Paul), Nov. 16, 1995, at 1OA; Sam Martino,
City May Duke it out with the Marlboro Man, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Nov. 6, 1995, at 1.
5. The First Amendment states: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
6. For example, in 1994, Penn Advertising, Inc., the largest outdoor advertising company
in Baltimore, brought suit in the United States District Court in Maryland to challenge the
constitutionality of the advertising ban in Baltimore on First Amendment grounds. See Geyelin,
infra note 7, at B5. In 1995, Martin Media Company and Norton Outdoor Advertising
Company, two major advertising concerns in Cincinnati, challenged the Cincinnati city
ordinance in the United States District Court in Cincinnati on the grounds that the ordinance
was a violation of the First Amendment's protection of commercial speech. See Kaufman, supra
note 4, at C2. However, shortly before the Fourth Circuit delivered its decision upholding the
constitutionality of the advertising ban in Baltimore, the Cincinnati advertising companies
voluntarily dropped the suit and negotiated with the city to work out other arrangements. See id.
7. See Philip J. Hilts, Clinton To Seek New Restrictions On Young Smokers, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 10, 1995, at Al [hereinafter New Restrictions]. One month after President Clinton's
announcement, some members of Congress expressed bipartisan support for this plan. See
Congressmen Support Clinton's Cigarette Ban, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1995, at Al. Specifically,
Sen. Bob Bennett (R-UT), Chairman of the Senate Republican Health Care Task Force, pointed
out the importance of supporting President Clinton's plan to "cut down on the enticements of
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advertising within 1,000 feet of a school or playground and requires
those advertisements beyond 1,000 feet to appear only in black and
white text.8 In addition, the proposal prohibits the use of misleading
images such as Joe Camel on public billboards.9 Shortly after
President Clinton's announcement, the five largest tobacco
companies in the United States brought suit to challenge the legality
of this proposal primarily on First Amendment grounds.' °
In attacking the cigarette advertising ban, the tobacco and
advertising industries relied, in part, on the First Amendment
tobacco for America's youth." Id.
On the other hand, some senators have strongly objected to the new cigarette regulating
plan. A letter signed by then Majority Leader Bob Dole (R-Kan.), Minority Leader Tom
Dasehle (D-S.D.) and thirty other senators, claimed that the FDA plan would "trample [First]
Amendment rights to advertise legal products to adults." Teens, Tobacco Firms Stoke Smoking
debate on FDA Regulation, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 3, 1996, at I [hereinafter Teens, Tobacco].
8. See Hilts, supra note 7, at Al. Other measures proposed by President Clinton include:
(1) allowing only black-and-white text-only ads for tobacco products in publications with a
non-adult readership of 15% or with two million readers under age 18; (2) using only the
corporate name, not the cigarette brand name or corporate logo, for sponsorship of events; (3)
prohibiting give away items, such as caps, T-shirts, and bags, printed with cigarette brand
names; (4) requiring that the tobacco industry fund a $150 million national anti-smoking
advertising campaign directed at youths; and (5) requiring each tobacco manufacturer to submit
sample labels and advertisements to the FDA for enforcement purposes. See Debra G.
Herandez, Restrictions on Cigarette Advertising, EDITOR AND PUBLISHER MAG., Aug. 19,
1995, at 12.
9. See Hemandez, supra note 8, at 12. President Clinton linked the growth of teenage
smoking to the attractive advertisements: "When Joe Camel tells young children that smoking is
cool, when billboards tell teens that smoking will lead to true romance, when Virginia Slims
tells adolescents that cigarettes may make them thin and glamorous, then our children need our
wisdom, our guidance, and our experience[.]" Id.
10. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation, the Liggett Group, Inc., Lorillard
Tobacco Company, Philip Morris Companies, Inc., and R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company
brought suit in the United State District Court in Greensboro, North Carolina. See Glenn
Collins, Teenagers and Tobacco: The Reaction, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1995, at AIS. Also suing
was Coyne-Beahm Inc., an advertising agency that "derived substantial revenue from the
promotion of cigarettes." Id. The plaintiffs claimed that FDA proposals contained a "hidden
agenda" to ban cigarette smoking by adults. Moreover, the plaintiffs argued that restricting
certain ads to black-and-white text and banning tobacco billboards within 1,000 feet of schools
was more extensive than necessary and violated their freedom of commercial speech. See Wade
Lambert & Milo Geyelin, FDA's Planned Tobacco-Ad Rules Spur Suits Over Agency's Powers,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 14, 1995, at B6. The plaintiffs also contended that the FDA overstepped its
authority by proposing such sweeping advertising restrictions because Congress withheld
jurisdiction from the FDA when it passed the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act in
1965. See id The authority of the FDA to regulate cigarettes is beyond the scope of this Note.
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privilege of commercial speech." The Supreme Court reviewed this
privilege in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission of New York and articulated a "means-ends test" for
determining the constitutionality of the government's regulation of
commercial speech. 2 Under the Central Hudson test, regulation of
commercial speech is constitutional if (1) the government's interest
contemplated in the regulation is substantial, (2) the regulation
directly advances such interest, and (3) the regulation is not more
extensive than necessary to serve that interest. 3 However, this test is
vague, and the Court's application of the test in the post-Central
Hudson era fell short of providing a consistent interpretation.
Notably, in two commercial speech cases in 1995, which the Court
decided only two months apart, the Court appeared to exercise a
differing level of judicial scrutiny over the legislative judgment on
means-ends rationality.14
Although the Court has occasionally opined on balancing the
protection of free speech and the protection of children's welfare, 5 it
11. Professor Nowak defines commercial speech as any form of speech that "advertises a
product or service for profit or for a business purpose." JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D.
ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16.26, at 1062 (5th ed. 1995). However, courts have
applied the definition of commercial speech inconsistently. See id. For a general discussion of
the development of the commercial speech doctrine, see Jonathan Weinberg, Note,
Constitutional Protection of Commercial Speech, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 720 (1982); Thomas W.
Merrill, Comment, First Amendment Protection for Commercial Advertising: The New
ConstitutionalDoctrine, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 205 (1976).
12. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
13. Seeid.at566.
14. In Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 115 S. Ct 1585 (1995), a case decided on April 19,
1995, the Court stated that the legislature's judgment that a ban on alcohol-content labeling
would directly advance the government's interest in preventing a "strength war" among brewers
was irrational and speculative. See id. at 1593. However, in Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc.,
115 S. Ct 2371 (1995), a case decided on June 21, 1995, the Court deferred to the legislative
judgment, which was based on data studies, history or common sense, that a prohibition on
soliciting accident victims' families by lawyers would directly advance the government's
interest in preserving the privacy of victims' families and the ethical integrity of the legal
profession. See id. at 2378.
15. See, e.g., Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 131 (1989)
(invalidating a federal statute that banned indecent telephone messages on the ground that a
total ban exceeded that which was needed to curtail children's access to such messages); New
York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 774 (1982) (concluding that the state's interest in protecting
minors from exploitation by child pornographers outweighed the interest of adults in obtaining
19971
Washington University Open Scholarship
312 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 52:307
has never addressed this issue in the context of regulating outdoor
cigarette advertising. However, the dispute surrounding the Baltimore
ordinance, 6 which bans billboard cigarette advertising in areas
regularly frequented by children, is likely to give the Court an
opportunity to address this issue. In Penn Advertising, Inc. v. Mayor
of Baltimore ("Penn Advertising /,),7 the Fourth Circuit interpreted
the means-ends test in Central Hudson as a standard of "reasonable
fit" between the legislative ends and the means chosen to accomplish
such ends, and upheld the Baltimore ordinance against a First
Amendment attack. 8 However, on appeal, the Supreme Court
vacated the decision of Penn Advertising I and remanded the case to
the Fourth Circuit 9 for further consideration in light of 44
Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island,0 which held that Rhode Island's
pornographic materials); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 751 (1978) (upholding the
banning of broadcasting obscene or profane materials in media in order to protect children);
Erznoznik v. City ofJacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 212 (1975) (noting that the government has the
right to adopt more stringent controls on media available to youths than on those primarily
available to adults); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 645 (1968) (upholding a law that
limited the availability of pornographic magazines to minors because of the potential harmful
effects).
16. Baltimore Ordinance 307 provides in relevant part: "No person may place any sign,
poster, placard, device, graphic display, or other form of advertising that advertises cigarettes in
apublicly visible location. In this section 'publicly visible location' includes outdoor billboards,
sides of buildings, and free standing signboards." BALTIMORE, MD. CODE art. 30, § 10.0-1(I)
(1994), cited in Penn Advertising, Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 63 F.3d 1318, 1321 n.1 (4th Cir.
1995) (emphasis added).
17. 63 F.3d 1318 (4th Cir. 1995). Decided on August 31, 1995, Penn Advertising I was
regarded as the first federal appeals court decision upholding a local government's restrictions
on cigarette billboards. See Milo Geyelin, Court Rules Cigarette Billboards Can Be Limited to
Protect Minors, WALL ST. J., Sept. 7, 1995, at B2.
On the same day as Penn Advertising I was decided, the Fourth Circuit delivered a
companion case, Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Schmoke, 63 F.3d 1305 (4th Cir. 1995) (hereinafter
Anheuser-Busch 1]. In Anheuser-Busch 1, the court upheld a similar Baltimore city ordinance
banning the outdoor advertising of alcoholic beverages in certain locations of the city. See id
Finding that the constitutionality issue of cigarette and beverage advertising bans is the same,
the Penn Advertising I court expressly adopted Anheuser-Busch /'s reasoning in full. See Penn
Advertising 1, 63 F.3d at 1325-26. For the convenience of discussion, this author will, where
appropriate, cite the Anheuser-Busch I opinion as the Penn Advertising I opinion in the
footnotes.
18. See Penn Advertising 1, 63 F.3d at 1326.
19. Penn Advertising, Inc. v. Mayor ofBaltimore, 116 S. Ct. 2575 (1996).
20. 116 S. Ct. 1495 (1996).
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ban on the advertising of alcoholic beverage price violated the First
Amendment. On remand, the Fourth Circuit again upheld the
constitutionality of the Baltimore ordinance in November 1996
("Penn Advertising II').2  The court in Penn Advertising II
distinguished 44 Liquormart because Rhode Island's ban, which
prohibited liquor price advertising in all manners except for price
signs displayed with the beverages, was far more sweeping than
Baltimore's ban on cigarette billboard advertising, which merely
restricts the time, place, and manner of such advertising.22
Because the Fourth Circuit would rule on three pending
challenges to the Clinton administration's proposals,' the ruling in
Penn Advertising H will have significant impact on the Clinton
administration's proposals restricting cigarette advertising in various
media. Indeed, the Wall Street Journal anticipates that Penn
Advertising II increases the possibility that at least some of Clinton's
proposals will survive constitutional challenges. 24
This Note argues that the government's special interest in
protecting children justifies a limited cigarette billboard advertising
ban, such as the one in Baltimore. Part I briefly traces the legislative
efforts in regulating cigarette advertising. Part II reviews the evolving
judicial standard in reviewing the regulation of commercial
advertising. Part III summarizes the Fourth Circuit's holdings in Penn
Advertising I and Penn Advertising IT Part IV analyzes the balancing
21. Penn Advertising, Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 101 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 1996)
[hereinafter Penn Advertising I1]. On the same day, the Fourth Circuit delivered its opinion in
Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Schmoke, 101 F.3d 325 (4th Cir. 1996) [hereinafter Anheuser-Busch
11]. As in Penn Advertising 1, the Penn Advertising 11 court expressly adopted the reasoning of
Anheuser-Busch II in full. See Penn Advertising II, 101 F.3d at 333. For the convenience of
discussion, this author will, where appropriate, cite the Anheuser-Busch II opinion as the Penn
Advertising 11 opinion in the footnotes of this Note.
22, SeeAnheuser-Busch 11, 101 F.3d at 328-29.
23, See Milo Geyelin, Appeals Court Again Upholds Ban Involving Billboard Cigarette
Ads, WALL ST. J., Nov. 15, 1996, at B10.
24, See id. Although the ruling in Penn Advertising II provides strong support to the
Clinton administration's proposed ban on cigarette advertising within 1000 feet of schools and
playgrounds, it remains unclear how the ruling would affect more sweeping proposals such as
those requiring only black-and-white text for outdoor advertising and magazines read by
children. See id.
1997]
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of the protection of children and the First Amendment rights of free
speech and argues that the limited cigarette billboard advertising ban
in Baltimore is constitutional.
I. CIGARETTE ADVERTISING LEGISLATION
A. Broadcasting Ban
The publication of the Surgeon General's report in 1964, linking
cigarette smoking to lung cancer and heart disease," increased the
momentum for the regulation of cigarette marketing and promotion.2 6
In 1964, Congress passed the Federal Cigarette Labeling and
Advertising Act (FCLAA).27 In addition to mandating a warning on
cigarette packages about the health hazards of smoking,28 the FCLAA
required the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to issue
reports on the number of smoking advertisements on the airwaves.29
The FCC's 1968 report revealed an astonishing frequency of cigarette
TV advertisements viewed by minors.3"
In 1969, out of its concern over the effects of cigarette TV
advertising on the well-being of young people, Congress enacted the
Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act (PHCSA).3t The PHCSA
enhanced the gravity of health hazard warnings on cigarette
packages,32 and banned the advertising of cigarettes from radio and
25. See, e.g., Kenneth L. Polin, Argument for the Ban of Tobacco Advertising: A First
Amendment Analysis, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 99, 101 n.15 (1988).
26. See David S. Welkowitz, Smoke in the Air: Commercial Speech and Broadcasting, 7
CARDOZO L. REv. 47,48 (1985).
27. Pub. L. No. 89-92,79 Stat. 282 (1965) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1331-1341
(1994).
28. Before 1970, the FCLAA required the following warning: "Caution: Cigarette
Smoking May Be Hazardous to Your Health." Pub. L. No. 89-92, § 4, 79 Stat. 282, 283 (1965)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (1994)).
29. See 15 U.S.C. § 1337 (1994).
30. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 91-566, at 3, 5, 19 (1969), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2652, 2656. The 1968 report showed that each child watched 44.5 cigarette commercials and
that each teenager watched 60.88 cigarette commercials in the month of January, 1968. See id.
31. Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87 (1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-
1341 (1994)).




TV beginning January 1, 197 L"
The broadcasting ban of cigarette advertisements survived
constitutional challenge in Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell in
1971." The plaintiffs, several broadcasters and the National
Association of Broadcasters, contended that the advertising ban under
the PHCSA violated their First Amendment right to freedom of
speech and their due process rights.35 The federal district court in
Washington, D.C. upheld the advertising ban, and the Supreme Court
affirmed without an opinion. 6
The Capital Broadcasting court's analysis of the First
Amendment rights of broadcasters was cursory.37 The district court
packages: "Warning: The Surgeon General Has Determined That Cigarette Smoking Is
Dangerous to Your Health." Pub. L. No. 91-222, § 4, 84 Stat. at 88 (codified as amended at 15
US.C. § 1333(a)(1) (1994)).
33. See 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1994). The PHCSA, later amended to include little cigars,
currently reads: "After January 1, 1971, it shall be unlawful to advertise cigarettes and little
cigars on any medium of electronic communications subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal
Communications Commission." Id.
Notably, before the cigarette TV advertising ban, the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) declared that the fairness doctrine, a now-abolished rule that required the
broadcasting of opposing viewpoints on controversial issues of public importance, should be
applied to cigarette advertising. See 47 C.F.I. § 73.1910 (1987); Mark A. Conrad, The Demise
of the Fairness Doctrine: A Blow for Citizen Access, 41 FED. COMM. L.J. 161, 168 (1989). The
District of Columbia Circuit upheld the FCC's application of the fairness doctrine to require
anti-smoking broadcasts by cigarette companies outlining the danger of smoking. See Banzhaf
v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969). Ironically, the 1969
advertising ban of cigarettes on TV and radio was, in part, a response to pressure from the
cigarette industry, which felt that a total ban would be less detrimental than the mandatory anti-
smoking advertisements. See Mark A. Conrad, Board of Trustees of the State University of New
York v. Fox-The Dawn of A New Age of Commercial Speech Regulation of Tobacco and
Alcohol, 9 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 61, 90 (1990).
34. 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971), afd mem. sub nom. Capital Broadcasting Co. v.
Kleindienst, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972).
35. See id. at 584-85.
36. See405 U.S. 1000(1972).
37. See Capital Broadcasting, 333 F. Supp. at 584. Judge Skelly Wright's dissenting
opinion, however, was based mainly on First Amendment grounds. See id. at 589-94. Judge
Wright argued that the majority ignored the First Amendment rights of viewers and listeners,
whose rights should be considered of paramount importance. See id. at 593. Therefore, he
considered the advertising ban an unconstitutional infringement on viewers' access to important
information. See id. Moreover, Judge Wright pointed out that Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082
(D.C. Cir. 1968) had recognized smoking as an issue of "public controversy." Id. at 592. Thus,
Judge Wright concluded that the First Amendment fully protected cigarette advertising. See id.
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based its decision on the premise that product advertising
traditionally received less protection under the First Amendment than
other forms of speech.38 Without a detailed review of the First
Amendment rights, the district court concluded that Congress could
ban advertising in any media by using either its power to regulate
interstate commerce or its supervisory power to control regulatory
agencies. 9
Notably, the Capital Broadcasting court gave great consideration
to the broadcast media's special accessibility to children, a feature
different from other forms of media.4" The district court implied that
the uniquely accessible nature of the broadcast media made it more
susceptible to governmental regulation, and granted the broadcast
media a lower level of constitutional protection.4' The district court's
concern for children's welfare echoed the Supreme Court's earlier
opinion in Ginsberg v. New York,42 where the Court emphasized the
importance of protecting children's well-being, and upheld a law that
restricted the availability of pornographic magazines to minors.43
The legal significance of the Capital Broadcasting rationale is not
clear. The Capital Broadcasting court followed the Supreme Court's
decision in Valentine v. Chrestensen,4 which denied any First
Amendment protection to commercial advertising.4" Five years after
Capital Broadcasting, the Court rapidly changed its course in
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
at 594.
38. See Capital Broadcasting, 333 F. Supp. at 584.
39. See id. The district court noted that courts have repeatedly upheld similar advertising
regulations. See New York State Broadcasters Ass'n v. United States, 414 F.2d 990 (2d Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1061 (1970) (upholding the FCC ban of broadcast lottery
information); United States v. Re, 336 F.2d 306 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 904
(1964) (upholding the powers of SEC to regulate information in stock business solicitation);
Giant Food Inc. v. FTC, 322 F.2d 977 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. dismissed, 376 U.S. 967 (1964)
(upholding the FTC advertising regulations to prevent unfair and deceptive practices).
40. See Capital Broadcasting, 333 F. Supp. at 585-86.
41. Seeid. at584.
42. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
43. See id.
44. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
45. See id. at 54.
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Council.46 In Virginia Pharmacy, the Court conferred a degree of
First Amendment protection to commercial speech to protect "a
consumer's interest in the free flow of commercial information.'
'47
Although Justice Blackmun distinguished Virginia Pharmacy from
Capital Broadcasting based on the special problems inherent in the
electronic media,4 commentators appeared convinced that the
modem commercial speech doctrine precludes the Capital
Broadcasting analysis.49
After Virginia Pharmacy, the Court never reexamined the
broadcast ban on cigarette advertising." Arguably, to the extent that
Capital Broadcasting relied on Valentine, Capital Broadcasting's
analysis is no longer valid. However, the Capital Broadcasting
court's emphasis on children's interest should remain viable, given
the fact that the Supreme Court has continued its special
consideration of children's well-being.5
Despite the increasingly serious health hazards of smoking,52 and
the need to expand and strengthen the regulation of cigarette
advertising in non-electronic media, various legislative efforts have
yielded little because of the complicated nature of cigarette regulation
and the strong lobbying by the cigarette and advertising industries.53
46. 425 U.S. 748 (1975).
47. Id at 763. The Court reasoned that the most efficient allocation of resources comes
about when consumers are "intelligent and well-informed." Id. at 765.
48. See id. at 773.
49. Professor Nowak, for example, reasoned that because the Capital Broadcasting
decision was based on Chrestensen and its progeny, Justice Blackmun's reference to the
Capital Broadcasting decision in Virginia Pharmacy was inaccurate. See JOHN E. NOWAK ET
AL , CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 933 (2d ed. 1983). ("[Tlhe [Mitchell] decision was not based upon
any special aspects of the broadcast media; rather it was squarely based on a view of the
commercial speech doctrine promulgated in Chrestensen, that so-called commercial speech is
completely outside the protection of the first amendment."). Cf Gregory T. Wuliger, The
Constitutional Rights of Puffery: Commercial Speech and the Cigarette Broadcast Advertising
Ban, 36 FED. COMM. L.J. 1 (1984) (arguing that reliance on Capital Broadcasting analysis is
inappropriate).
50. See Conrad, supra note 33, at 91.
51. See cases cited supra note 15.
52. Congressional findings showed that tobacco use in the United States results in more
than 450,000 deaths each year. See H.R. 2147, 103d Cong. § 2 (1993).
53. See infra notes 60-63 and accompanying text for discussions of various bills in
Congress. The tobacco industry reportedly gave $5.6 million to political candidates for federal
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Therefore, seventeen years after the enactment of the PHCSA, the
only concrete progress that Congress has made was the
Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco Health Education Act of 1986,"4
which similarly banned electronic media advertising of smokeless
tobacco and required comparable warning labels on smokeless
tobacco product packages and print advertisements.55 The 1986 Act
did no more than impose on smokeless tobacco advertisements the
same level of restriction as cigarettes.
B. Legislative Efforts to Restrict Cigarette Advertising
The tobacco industry has appeared to be so strong, both
economically and legally, that it was once regarded as almost
unbeatable in legal battles. 6 Although an increasing number of
smoking victims have been waging wars against the industry for tort
liability, rarely have they succeeded in court. 7 In the legislative
offices in 1992. See Mark Curriden, The Heat Is On, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1994, at 58, 59. In 1993,
reports said that the $1.6 million in campaign contributions were only a fraction of the
contributions made on behalf of the cigarette lobby. See Shannon Brownlee & Steven V.
Roberts, Should Cigarettes Be Outlawed?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 18, 1994, at 32, 38.
The tobacco industry also donated money to non-profit organizations favored by key lawmakers
and even their spouses. See id.
54. Pub. L. No. 99-252, 100 Stat. 30 (1986) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4401-4408 (1994).
On November 4, 1993, the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") issued a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, proposing to require racing cars sponsored by smokeless tobacco manufacturers to
carry the same health warning labels currently mandated for smokeless tobacco packages. See
58 Fed. Reg. 58810 (1993) (proposed Nov. 4, 1993)).
55. See Pub. L. No. 99-252, § 3(a)(2), 100 Stat. at 31 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 4402(a)(2)
(1994)).
56. See generally Irene Scharf, Breathe Deeply: The Tort of Smokers' Battery, 32 HOJS.
L. REV. 615 (1995) (discussing the legal difficulties of imposing liability on the tobacco
industry, and the causes of action and types of damages in such lawsuits).
57. See, e.g., Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 849 F.2d 230, 236 (6th Cir. 1988)
(affirming the district court's judgment and holding that the claim of failure to warn under
Tennessee state laws was preempted by federal laws and that cigarettes were neither defective
nor unreasonably dangerous); Ross v. Philip Morris & Co., 328 F.2d 3, 13-14 (8th Cir. 1964)
(affirming the district court's judgment and stating that while a manufacturer is held as an
absolute insurer against knowable dangers, knowledge is still a condition of liability). See also
Charles Strum, Major Lawsuit on Smoking Is Dropped, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1992, at B11, B5
("For four decades the cigarette industry has been successful in defending itself in [smoke-
related injury] cases, never settling nor paying any damages or compensation.").
However, in recent years the victims have begun to gain limited victories. In 1988, in
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arena, the tobacco industry has similarly extended its influence to
defeat a variety of proposals aimed at restricting cigarette advertising
in non-electronic media such as magazines, billboards, street cars,
and sporting events-areas in which tobacco companies have spent
huge amounts of advertising dollars to circumvent the broadcasting
ban.58
Nevertheless, like the incessant litigation against the tobacco
industry,59 the legislative efforts in Congress have been continuous.'
Cipollone v Liggett Group. Inc., 693 F. Supp. 208, 219 (D. N.J. 1988), affid in part, rev'd in
part, and remanded, 893 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1990), affid in part, rev'd in part, and remanded,
505 U.S. 504 (1992), the jury ordered the Liggett Group to pay $400,000 of compensatory
damages to the husband of the deceased smoker on an express warranty claim. The Supreme
Court affirmed the Third Circuit's decision that federal statute did not preempt the common law
warranty claim, but remanded the case for examining the express warranty issue. See Cipollone,
505 U.S. at 530-31. Moreover, in September 1995, a San Francisco jury awarded $1.3 million
in compensatory damages and $700,000 in punitive damages, the largest damage award in a
tobacco liability suit, against Lorillard, Inc. and its filter-manufacturer for using asbestos in
filters in the 1950s. See Suein L. Hwang, Former Smoker Is Awarded $2 Million, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 5, 1995, at B6.
58. See Alan Blum, M.D., The Marlboro Grand Prix: Circumvention of the Television
Ban on Tobacco Advertising, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 913, 914 (1991). For discussion of the
tobacco companies' heavy use of motorsports in advertising, see Locke, infra note 60, at 221.
59. The wave of litigation against the tobacco industry has continued to increase. Most
notably, a suit for $200 billion in damages has been filed in a Florida court by a group of
smokers suffering from lung cancer and emphysema, contending addiction as the cause. See
Michael Janofsky, Ailing Smokers Sue the Tobacco Industry, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 1994, at Al1.
The plaintiffs accused the industry of deceiving the public about the health problems resulting
from smoking by denying the addictiveness of cigarettes, and suppressing research. See id.
60. Approximately 20 bills on reducing the rate of tobacco consumption in the United
States were pending in Congress during the period between 1985 and 1987. Typically, these
bills include, inter alia: (1) S. 1950, 99th Cong. (1985) (to amend the Internal Revenue Code to
disallow an income tax deduction for advertising any tobacco product); (2) Health Protection
Act of 1986, H.1L 4972, 99th Cong. (1986) (to prohibit advertising or promotion of all tobacco
products in any medium); (3) Nonsmokers Health Protection Act of 1987, H.R. 1008, 100th
Cong. (1987) (to restrict smoking in federal buildings); (4) Prohibition of Smoking in Public
Conveyances Act of 1987, S. 51, 100th Cong. (1987) (to ban all smoking on public conveyance
such as planes, trains and buses, and restricts smoking in terminal and station buildings); (5)
Health Protection Act of 1987, H.R. 1272, 100th Cong. (1987) (to amend the Federal Cigarette
Labeling and Advertising Act and the Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco Health Education
Act of 1986 to prohibit "any consumer sales promotion" of tobacco products); and (6) Health
Protection Act of 1987, H.L 1532, 100th Cong. (1987) (to disallow any consumer sales
promotion of tobacco products, including sponsorship of athletic or artistic events under the
registered brand name of a tobacco product). House Bills 1272 and 1532 are similar to House
Bill 4972. The subsequent bills are mainly products of modified versions of the previous ones.
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Among numerous bills before Congress, the Health Protection Act of
1986 ("House Bill 4972"),6 the Tobacco Control and Health
Protection Act of 1990 ("House Bill 5041"),62 and the Tobacco
Education and Child Protection Act of 1993 ("House Bill 3614',)63
are closely related to the topic of this Note and merit discussion.
1. Health Protection Act
In 1985, the American Medical Association ("AMA")
overwhelmingly voted to urge Congress to outlaw tobacco
advertising and promotion.' In 1986, after finding that smoking
posed severe health hazards,' Representative Mike Synar of
The later bills include, inter alia: (1) Children's Health Protection Act of 1989, H.R. 1493,
101st Cong. (1989) (to modify House Bill 1532 and allow tobacco companies to sponsor events
only in the registered company name, logo, or symbol without pictures or graphics); (2)
Tobacco Control and Health Protection Act, H.R. 5041, 101st Cong. (1990) (to completely ban
corporate use of tobacco product trademarks in the sponsoring of sporting and entertainment
events); (3) Fairness in Tobacco and Nicotine Regulation Act of 1993, H.R. 2147, 103d Cong.
(1993) (to give the FDA authority to regulate the manufacture, labeling, distribution, sale,
promotion, and advertising of tobacco products); (4) Tobacco Education and Children
Protection Act of 1993, H.R. 3614, 103d Cong. (1993) (to restrict the advertising and promotion
of tobacco products through amendment of existing regulations); and (5) Youth Smoking
Prevention Act of 1995, H.R. 2414, 104th Cong. (1995) (to prohibit the sale of tobacco
products to teenagers under 18 years old and to ban billboard advertising near schools and
playgrounds). For additional background information about the relevant congressional bills
before 1994, see David A. Locke, Note, Counterspeech as an Alternative to Prohibition:
Proposed Federal Regulation of Tobacco Promotion in American Motorsport, 70 IND. L.J. 217
(1994).
61. H.R. 4972, 99th Cong. (1986).
62. H.R. 5041, 101st Cong. (1990).
63. H.R 3614, 103d Cong. (1993).
64. See Philip M. Boffey, A.M.A. Votes to Seek Total Ban on Advertising Tobacco
Products, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1985, at Al.
65. The findings in the bill include, in part, the following:
(1) tobacco use is the leading preventable cause of illness and premature death in the
United States, and is the major cause of lung, larynx, oral cavity, and esophagus cancer
and is a contributory factor in cancer of the urinary bladder, kidney, and pancreas;
(2) cigarette smoking is the primary cause of lung cancer in women, responsible for
about 75 percent of 38,600 deaths per year,
(3) the United States health care system spent an estimated $22 billion to treat
smoking related illnesses in 1985, of which the federal government paid about $4.2




Oklahoma and several other congressmen introduced the Health
Protection Act.'
House Bill 4972 represented a sweeping attempt to ban "[a]ll
consumer sales promotion of tobacco products by manufacturers,
packers, distributors, importers, or sellers of such products in or
affecting commerce. 67 The ban covered a wide array of advertising
media including radio, television, newspaper, magazines, billboards,
posters, signs, decals, match books, retail outlet posters (except price
information), and all other materials used to promote the sale or
consumption of tobacco products.68 The bill also prohibited
advertising promotion allowances, premiums and free samples, and
the sponsorships of athletic, artistic or other events under the
registered brandname of a tobacco product.69
House Bill 4972's outright and indiscriminate ban on all kinds of
advertising was overbroad. Even after its sponsors substantially
compromised the broad ban by permitting some type of corporate
tobacco sponsorship and black-and-white print advertisements under
the Children's Health Protection Act of 1989 ("House Bill 1493),7
these concessions failed to gain support in the House Committee on
Energy and Commerce.7'
2. Tobacco Control and Health Protection Act
In 1990, the anti-smoking advocates, represented by
(4) sales promotion of tobacco products undermines the credibility of government
and private health education campaigns against smoking.
H.R. 4972, 99th Cong. § 2 (1986).
66. See § 1.
67. See § 3(a).
68. See § 5(2)(A).
69. See §§ 5(2XB)-(D).
70. H.R 1493, 101st Cong. (1989). House Bill 1493 provides two attempts at
compromise: (1) tobacco companies would be allowed to sponsor events, vehicles, sports
equipment, and toys "in the name of a registered brand name, logo, or symbol" of a tobacco
product, provided that the registered brand name was also the name of the corporate
manufacturer and (2) print advertisements would be permitted so long as they utilized a black-
and-white format without pictures or graphics. § 3(b)(2), § 3(a)(3).
71. See Locke, supra note 60, at 234.
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Representatives Henry Waxman from California and Mike Synar
from Oklahoma,72 introduced the ambitious Tobacco Control and
Health Protection Act.73 Unlike House Bill 1493, which allowed
certain types of sports sponsorship by tobacco companies,74 House
Bill 5041 banned the corporate use of tobacco product brandnames in
sports and entertainment events.' Similar to House Bill 1493, House
72. Representative Synar, a long-time anti-smoking activist, lost his re-election bid in the
November 1994 congressional race. It is not clear how Mr. Synar's absence in the House of
Representatives will affect anti-smoking legislative efforts.
73. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
74. See supra note 70.
75. H.R. 5041, 101st Cong. (1989). Section 6 of the bill provides in relevant part:
(a) Advertising. It shall be unlawful for any person to manufacture, package, or
distribute for sale within the United States any tobacco product except in accordance
with the following requirements:
(1) No human or cartoon figure or facsimile thereof, no tobacco product trademark
logo or symbol, and no picture, other than the picture of a single package of the
tobacco product being advertised which meets the requirement of subsection (C)
displayed against a neutral white background, shall be used in or as part of any tobacco
product advertisement.
(2) The print in any tobacco product advertisement, including the print on any
tobacco product package in any tobacco product advertisement, shall be black on a
white background.
(3) No tobacco product shall be located-
(A) in or on a sports stadium or other sports facility or any other facility where
sporting activity is regularly performed,
(B) on cars, boats, or other sporting equipment used in or associated with any
sporting event, or
(C) within 1,000 feet of any school which student under the age of21 years of age
regularly attend.
(b) Promotion. It shall be unlawful ...
(1) to distribute or cause to be distributed any tobacco products as a free sample or
to make any tobacco product available at no or reduced cost through use of coupons or
other promotional method,
(2) to sponsor or cause to be sponsored any athletic, music, artistic, or other event
in the name of a tobacco product trademark....
(3) to market or cause to be marketed non-tobacco products (including toys) or
services which bears the name of a tobacco product trademark,
(4) to pay or cause to be paid to have any tobacco product or any tobacco product
trademark appear in any movie, music video, television show, play, video arcade
game, or other form of entertainment, or
(5) to pay or cause to be paid to have any tobacco product trademark appear on
any vehicle, boat, or other equipment used in sports.
(c) Tobacco Product Packages. It shall be unlawful ... if the package of the product
... contains a picture or human figure or facsimile thereof or cartoon figure ....
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Bill 5041 continued to allow the black-and-white print
advertisements. 6 Notably, House Bill 5041 explicitly expanded the
age range of the protected young people to twenty-one years of age
and specifically prohibited outdoor advertising signs within 1,000
feet of schools regularly attended by students under twenty-one years
of age.7 President Clinton's executive proposal banning certain
outdoor cigarette advertising adopted the concept of a 1,000-foot no-
advertising zone.7
However, powerful lobbying by the tobacco industry eliminated
the advertising and promotion restrictions, leaving only the black-
and-white format requirement intact.79 Moreover, the House
Committee on Energy and Commerce took no action on the toothless
revised bill during the 101st Congress, thus providing another
example of a fruitless legislative attempt to regulate cigarette
advertising and promotion. The failure of House Bills 4972, 1493,
and 5041 implies that a cigarette advertising bill is unlikely to pass
various legislative hurdles if its scope and manner of regulation are
not narrowly calculated.
3. Tobacco Education and Child Protection Act
House Bill 3614 represents a change of legislative technique.80
The bill's sponsors, Representatives Waxman and Synar, used the
(d) Audio Tape, Audio Discs, Videotape, and Film. It shall be unlawful to advertise
any tobacco product on any audio tape, audio disc, videotape, video arcade game, or
film.
H.R. 5041, 101st Cong. § 6.
76. See H.R 5041, 101st Cong. § 6(aX2).
77. See H.R. 5041, 101st Cong. § 6(a)(3)(c). Cf H.R. 2414, 104th Cong. § 3(a)(K)(I)
(1995) (prohibiting tobacco billboard advertising "within the line of sight of any individual in a
school or in an area designated as a playground"); H.R. 3614, 103d Cong. § 6(a)(2)(B) (1993)
(prohibiting tobacco product advertisement "within 2,000 feet of any school which students
under the age of 18 years of age regularly attend").
78. See supra note 8 and accompanying text for President Clinton's proposal.
79. See Julie Rovner, House Subcommittee Approves Strong Antitobacco Measure, 48
CONG. Q. 2922 (1990). The bill's provisions on restricting advertising and promotion were
regarded "by far the most contested portion of the bill." Id.
80. H.R. 3614, 103d Cong. (1993).
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goal of protecting children to justify the means of restricting adults'
access to commercial information about tobacco products."' House
Bill 3614 uniquely added a declaration-of-purpose section to the
beginning of the bill, providing as its objective to protect children's
interests by ensuring accurate information about the adverse health
effects of smoking, and by requiring the display of such information
on tobacco packaging, advertising and promotion.82 In contrast,
House Bills 4972 and 5041 lacked a declaration-of-purpose section
and started immediately with the fact-finding sections.8 ' Although
this structural revision does not necessarily indicate a substantive
policy change, it may signal a change in legislative technique by
asserting a compelling societal interest to preempt challenge.
8 4
On the other hand, House Bill 3614 demonstrates legislative
flexibility by markedly reducing the restrictions on advertising
tobacco products at sporting events. House Bill 5041, the immediate
81. H.R. 3614, 103d Cong. § 2.
82. Id. The "purpose" section reads:
It is the purpose of this Act to assure that accurate information on the adverse health
effects of tobacco use are displayed on tobacco product packaging, advertising, and
promotion in an effective means that will assist-
(1) adolescents who are tempted to start using tobacco products,
(2) adolescent who are experimenting with tobacco and are not yet addicted to
tobacco, and
(3) adults and adolescents who are considering quitting, to reduce serious
risks to their health.
Id.
83. See supra notes 65, 75.
84. See Locke, supra note 60, at 236 ("With protection of children's health as the stated
purpose, it is presumptively easier for the government to show both a substantial interest and
direct advancement of that interest.") (footnote omitted).
85. See H.R. 3614, 103d Cong. § 6(b). Section 6 of the bill provides, in relevant part:
(a) Advertising. It shall be unlawful for any person to manufacture, package, or
distribute for sale within the United States any tobacco product unless the advertising
for such tobacco product conforms with the following requirements:
(1) Audio'Tape, Audio Discs, Videotape, and Film. No tobacco product may be
advertised on any audio tape, audio disc, videotape, video arcade game, or film.
(2) Location. No tobacco product advertisement shall be located-
(A) in or on a sports stadium or other sports facility or any other facility where
sporting activity is performed, or




legislative predecessor of House Bill 3614, made it unlawful to
advertise or promote cigarettes by showing product trademarks on
sports facilities, vehicles, or sports equipment. 6 Under House Bill
3614, however, it is permissible for tobacco product trademarks to
appear under those circumstances as long as the equipment or
clothing displays a warning label.8 7 Moreover, House Bill 3614
allows the sponsoring of a sporting event in the name of a tobacco
product trademark if health information, which is "in the same
proportion or prominence as the sponsor [having] sponsored such
event," is simultaneously disseminated at the event."
The structural and substantive changes under House Bill 3614
may represent a revised strategy by Congress to set a more defined
end of protecting the compelling interest of children in regulating
cigarette advertising. However, the constitutional viability of a
legislative act that restricts cigarette advertising will ultimately
depend on the Supreme Court's treatment of judicial review standard,
age regularly attend.
(b) Promotion. It shall be unlawful for any person to manufacture, package, or
distribute for sale within the United States any tobacco product unless the promotion
for such tobacco product conforms with the following requirements:
(1) Distribution. No tobacco product may be distributed or caused to be distributed
as a free sample.
(2) Vending Machine. No tobacco product may be sold or distributed through a
vending machine ....
(3) Sponsorship. No athletic , music, artistic, or other event may be sponsored or
caused to be sponsored in the name of a tobacco product trademark ... unless the
Secretary has approved a plan for the simultaneous dissemination of health
information at such event in the same proportion or prominence as the sponsor has
sponsored such event.
(4) Appearance with Entertainment. To pay or cause to be paid to have any
tobacco product or any tobacco product trademark appear in any movie, music video,
television show, play, video arcade game, or other form of entertainment.
(5) Sports Equipment. No tobacco product trademark may appear on any vehicle,
boat, or other equipment or clothing used in sports unless such equipment or clothing
displays a health warning pursuant to regulations of the Secretary which assure
prominence equivalent to that required by section 5(b)(1).
Id.
86. H.R. 5041, 101st Cong. § 6(aX3).
87. H.I 3614, 103dCong. § 6(bX5).
88. H.R. 3614, 103d Cong. § 6(bX3).
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currently the Central Hudson test. Therefore, the outcome of the
Supreme Court's review in Penn Advertising should have a great
impact on the future legislative regulation of cigarette advertising.
II. THE CENTRAL HUDSON TEST AND ITS APPLICATION IN
REVIEWING ADVERTISING REGULATIONS
A. The Central Hudson Test
In 1942, the Supreme Court held that the government had
unlimited power to ban advertising because the First Amendment did
not protect commercial speech.89 Although the Court radically limited
this holding in 1975,90 it was not until its 1976 decision in Virginia
89. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) ("We are ... clear that the
Constitution imposes no... restraint on govemment as respects purely commercial advertising.
Whether, and to what extent, one may ... promote or pursue a gainful occupation in the streets
... [is a] matter[] for legislative judgment."). In Valentine, the Court held that a New York
ordinance banning distribution of business advertisements in street did not violate the First
Amendment. See id. at 55.
In concluding that the First Amendment does not protect commercial speech, however, the
Court provided no precedent or other authority. The Court seemed to conclude that commercial
speech is nothing more than another form of commercial activity that can be regulated by the
states in any manner that it considers reasonable. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 11,
§ 16.27. This type of analysis, proposed by the Court in the determining the constitutionality of
a regulation on commerce, is an economic due process analysis derived directly from Nebbia v.
New York "If the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative
purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of due process are
satisfied ... " 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934).
90. See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (holding a Virginia statute prohibiting
abortion advertising unconstitutional because the "commercial aspects" of the abortion
advertising did not negate its First Amendment protection, and because the advertising included
information of public interest involving the exercise of the freedom of opinion dissemination).
During the period between Valentine and Bigelow, the Court adhered to the Valentine
decision and employed a "dominant purpose" test, which examined whether the main motive
underlying the speech was one of profit-seeking. See NO\VAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 11, §
16.28, at 1064. See, e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265-66 (1964) (according
full protection to a political advertisement even though the newspaper was paid to print it);
Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 641-44 (1951) (holding that a statute preventing door-to-
door solicitation is constitutional because the selling rendered it a commercial transaction);
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 111 (1943) (holding that the selling of religious




State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council91
that the Court expressly recognized that commercial speech deserves
First Amendment protection.' The Court, however, limited the
protection of commercial speech in other cases by pointing out that it
has only a secondary position in the ranking of First Amendment
rights.93
In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
91. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). In this case, the Court held a Virginia statute banning the
publication or advertising of prices for prescription drugs by licensed pharmacists
unconstitutional. See id. at 771-73. The Court found that the consumers' interests in the free
flow of pricing information, which is indispensable to the making of informed economic
decisions, outweighs the state's interest in maintaining the professionalism of pharmacists. See
id. at 765-70. The Court emphasized that the ban in question does not have a direct effect on
professional standards. See id. at 769.
92. See id. Justice Rehnquist filed the only dissent in Virginia Pharmacy. He opposed
extending the First Amendment protection to cover purely commercial activity. See id. at 781-
84 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). According to Justice Rehnquist, the propriety of allowing the
flow of free and full information should be left to state legislatures; the Court should not
mandate to states how they must regulate their economic or professional markets. See id. at 784
(citing Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934)).
93. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978). See also Florida Bar v.
Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371, 2375 (1995) (holding that review of commercial speech
regulation is one of intermediate scrutiny); Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S.
490, 505-07 (1981) (plurality opinion) (stating that protection of commercial speech is
significantly weaker than noncommercial speech in that regulation of the latter is examined
under a higher degree of scrutiny). For a detailed discussions on commercial speech, see C.
Edwin Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IOWA L. REV. 1,
49 (1976) (advancing the somewhat metaphysical notion that because profit orientation is
externally imposed on capitalist enterprises by the market, commercial speech cannot be rooted
in freedom of choice and thus can justifiably be restricted); Thomas H. Jackson & John Calvin
Jeffries, Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REV.
1, 30-31 (1979) (equating commercial speech with all other economic activities).
Notably, the Supreme Court has placed some types of political speech on the same level as
commercial speech. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 562 (1965) ("A State may adopt
safeguards necessary and appropriate to assure that the administration ofjustice.., is free from
outside control and influence."); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 516-17 (1951)
(plurality opinion) (applying the "clear and present danger" test and holding communist speech
advocating the overthrow of the government too dangerous to protect); Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (applying the "clear and present danger" test, and holding that a
circular which seemed effective in encouraging draft resistance during wartime was not
protected). But see NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982) (holding
consumer boycott for political purposes protected by the First Amendment); New York Times
Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 718 (1971) (permitting publication of Pentagon papers
despite government's argument that disclosure would threaten national security).
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Commission ofNew York,94 the Court attempted to clarify the level of
commercial speech protection and the standard of constitutional
review. The Court set out a detailed four-prong test to balance
commercial speech rights and the government's regulation of
advertising.' The Court in Central Hudson struck down a New York
regulation prohibiting promotional advertising by utilities
companies.96 The Court rejected the state's claim that a utility's
monopoly status, justified a ban on advertising because the
advertising was useless in a "noncompetitive market."'97
Under the Central Hudson test, four conditions must be met for a
regulation restricting commercial speech to pass First Amendment
muster. First, the commercial speech "must concern lawful activity
and not be misleading" (if not, the government can regulate or ban
the speech and the remainder of the test is not applicable).98 Second,
the government's interest in regulating the commercial speech must
be substantial." Third, the regulation must "directly advance[] the
governmental interest asserted."'00 Fourth, the regulation must not be
"more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest."''
1
The Central Hudson test can be ambiguous in application.'02 The
Central Hudson Court did not give further interpretation to the
"directly advances" and "not more extensive than is necessary"
standards. Thus an open question remains: what level of scrutiny
should a court use to review the legislative belief that its means of
regulating commercial speech are narrowly tailored to its chosen
ends?
94. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
95. See id. at 566.
96. See id. at 572.
97. Id. at 566-67.
98. CentralHudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
99. See id.
100. Id.
101. Id. In his concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun criticized the four-prong test as
insufficient, and inconsistent with the mandate of Virginia Pharmacy to safeguard commercial
speech rights under the First Amendment. See id. at 573-579 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
102. For theoretically conflicting arguments on the application of the Central Hudson test,
see Paul J. Weber and Greg Marks, Debate on the Constitutionality and Desirability of A




B. Application of the Central Hudson Test
1. Posadas and Fox: Heightened Deference to Legislative
Judgment
The ambiguity in the level of judicial deference to legislative
judgment has led to inconsistent results in post-Central Hudson
cases. Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto
Rico" 3 and Board of Trustees of the State University of New York v.
Fox" represent a deferential approach to legislative judgment.
Posadas is the first case where the Court approved a limited ban
of advertising a harmful though legal product since the emergence of
the commercial speech doctrine.' The Court upheld a Puerto Rico
statute prohibiting casino gambling advertisements aimed at residents
of Puerto Rico, despite the fact that gambling is legal in Puerto
Rico." The Court found that the local government has a substantial
interest in protecting the health, safety, and welfare of its citizenry by
reducing gambling among residents to prevent the "disruption of
moral and cultural patterns."'' 7 The Court also noted that the statute
directly advanced the government's interest, and rejected the
argument that the ban was "underinclusive" because the advertising
of traditional types of gambling, such as horse racing, cock-fighting,
and the lottery were not prohibited.0 8
Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist applied the Central
Hudson test in a less rigid manner, and deferred to the legislative
judgment that the harm of casino gambling is significantly greater
than that of traditional kinds of gambling in Puerto Rico.0 9
Incorporating Central Hudson's third and fourth prongs into a
"reasonable fit" standard, the Court stated that the legislature was in
103 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
104. 492 U.S. 469 (1989). For discussion of the Supreme Court's approach in Fox, see
Conrad, supra note 33.
105. See Conrad, supra note 33, at 79.
106. See Posadas, 478 U.S. at 348.
107. Id. at 341.
108. See id. at 342.
109. See id.
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the best position to decide what measure would be effective to
discourage gambling among local residents."' Although the Court
has not subsequently overruled Posadas' highly deferential approach,
the plurality opinion in the 1996 case of 44 Liquormar 1' indicates
that this approach is losing its validity."2
Following Posadas, the Court in Fox took another step toward
resolving the interpretation of the "not more extensive than
necessary" standard. The Court upheld a state university's regulation
banning "private commercial enterprises" from operating on its
campuses and thus barred a company from holding a "tupperware
party" in a student's dormitory."
The Fox court squarely confronted the issue of whether
restrictions on commercial speech are invalid if they go beyond the
least restrictive means to achieve the desired end." 4 The Fox Court
followed the Posadas rationale and gave a high degree of deference
to the government advertising regulation."' Furthermore, the Court
explained the meaning of the "reasonable fit" standard established in
Posadas:
[W]e have not gone so far as to impose upon [regulators] the
burden of demonstrating that... the manner of restriction is
absolutely the least severe that will achieve the desired end.
110. See id. at 341, 343. Justice Rehnquist did not give any explanation for his assertion
that if the legislature has authority to prohibit casino gambling, then it should also have
authority to prohibit casino advertising. See id. at 354 n.4. The plurality opinion in 44
Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island disagrees with this "greater-includes-the-lesser" notion
because it is "inconsistent with logic and well-settled doctrine." 116 S. Ct. 1495, 1512 (1996)
(plurality opinion).
111. 116 S. Ct. 1495 (1996) (plurality opinion).
112. See id. at 1511 ("[We are now persuaded that Posadas erroneously performed the
First Amendment analysis.") (opinion by Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsberg, JJ.).
113. See 492 U.S. at 471-72. The regulation provides:
No authorization will be given to private commercial enterprises to operate on State
University campuses or in facilities furnished by the University other than to provide
for food, legal beverages, campus bookstore, vending, linen supply, laundry, dry
cleaning, banking, barber and beautician services and cultural events.
Id. (quoting SUNY Resolution 66-156 (1979)).




What our decisions require is a 'fit' between the legislature's
ends and the means chosen to accomplish those ends,'-a fit
that is not necessarily perfect, but reasonable; that represents
not necessarily the single best disposition but one whose scope
is "in proportion to the interest served"; that employs not
necessarily the least restrictive means but . . . a means
narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective."'
In addition, although the Court required the state to carry the
burden of justifying its restrictions,"' the Court rejected the "least
restrictive test.""' The "reasonable fit between means and ends"
standard adopted by the Fox Court is more flexible and makes a
stronger case for advertising regulations to withstand constitutional
scrutiny." 9 Indeed, one commentator stated that the Fox standard
would boost the chances of the Court's acceptance of tobacco
advertising limitations.12 However, as the following section notes,
the Court's post-Fox cases do not provide a bright line rule.'
2
'
2. From Discovery Network to Florida Bar: Defining the
Perimeter of Intermediate Scrutiny
The Court's post-Fox cases in the 1990s applied the Central
Hudson test inconsistently. Although the Court did not expressly
limit Posadas and Fox, the ambiguity of the "reasonable fit" standard
gave ample room for differing interpretations. One line of cases
invalidated advertising restrictions under an implicitly enhanced
116 Id. (citations omitted).
117. Seeid.
118. See id. at 476-81. See, e.g., Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626,
647 (1985) (stating that the state must find less restrictive means to achieve its goal); Central
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980) ("[I]f the
governmental interest could be served as well by a more limited restriction on commercial
speech, the excessive restrictions cannot survive.").
119. See Albert P. Mauro, Jr., Comment, Commercial Speech After Posadas & Fox: A
Rational Basis Wolf in Intermediate Sheep's Clothing, 66 TUL. L. REV. 1931, 1950 (1992).
120. See Conrad, supra note 33, at 92.
121. See infra notes 125-69 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's commercial
speech decisions in the 1990s).
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scrutiny, which requires the choosing of a "less-burdensome
alternative."' 22 A second line of cases, however, employed a higher
level of judicial deference and upheld advertising regulations by
reiterating that the "least restrictive means" test plays no role in
intermediate scrutiny analysis under the Central Hudson test." In
addition, the Court tried to establish a compromise approach between
the two lines. 24
a. The "Less-Burdensome-Alternative" Approach: An
Enhanced Level of Intermediate Scrutiny
Beginning in 1993 with City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network,
Inc.,l s the Court moved toward subjecting regulation of commercial
speech to a higher degree of scrutiny.'26 Although continuing to cite
Posadas and Fox with support, the Court altered its previous
deferential stance by requiring the government to justify its
advertising restriction by choosing a less burdensome, though not the
least burdensome, alternative.'27
122. See, e.g., City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1505, 1510 n.13
(1993) ("[I]f there are numerous and obvious less-burdensome alternatives to the restriction on
commercial speech, that is certainly a relevant consideration in determining whether the 'fit'
between ends and means is reasonable.").
123. See United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 113 S. Ct. 2696,2705 (1993).
124. See Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371, 2380 (1995).
125. 113 S. Ct. 1505 (1993). Discovery Network is the first case after Fox where the Court
directly applied the Central Hudson test in reviewing the advertising regulation. But see R.AV.
v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 387-89 (1992) (extending the presumptive unconstitutionality
of content-based regulation to commercial speech); Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504
U.S. 374, 388-91 (1992) (holding that state regulation of airline advertising is preempted by the
Federal Airline Deregulation Act of 1978).
126. See Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 115 S. Ct. 1585 (1995) (invalidating a federal ban
on beer labeling of alcohol content); Ibanez v. Florida Dep't of Bus. and Prof'l Regulation, 114
S. Ct. 2084 (1994) (holding unconstitutional the reprimand of a lawyer who advertised her true
credentials as attorney, certified accountant (CPA), and certified financial planner (CFP));
Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1792 (1993) (invalidating a state ban on in-person solicitation by
CPAs); City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1505 (1993) (striking down a
city ban of commercial newsracks in public property).
127. See Rubin, 115 S. Ct. at 1593-94 (discussing other less-burdensome options available
to prevent an alcoholic content strength war); Edenfield, 113 S. Ct. at 1800 (stating that the
government has the burden of proving that the "restriction will in fact alleviate [the harms] to a
material degree") (citing Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 64849
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The Discovery Network Court struck down a Cincinnati city
ordinance banning newsracks containing commercial handbills but
allowing those containing newspapers.'28 Because the ban achieved
only a "'marginal degree of protection"' for the city's safety and
aesthetics interest, the Court held that there was no reasonable
relationship between the means and the end. 29
The dicta in Discovery Network arguably enhanced the Fox
"reasonable fit" threshold.' 0 While not limiting Fox, the Court
stressed that the government must carefully calculate the costs of
limiting commercial speech and must affirmatively prove the
reasonable fit between ends and means. 3t In contrast to the Fox
Court, which did not inquire into the regulator's study about the
advertising restriction, the Discovery Network Court found that the
city failed to either investigate the new development of the newsrack
advertising business or to explore the alternatives to regulating the
size, appearance, and number of newsracks.'32
In Edenfield v. Fane,'33 the Court continued the enhanced
intermediate scrutiny implied in Discovery Network. In Edenfield, the
Court held that Florida's ban on in-person solicitation by certified
public accountants (CPAs) violated the First Amendment.
34
(1985)); Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1510 n.13 (noting that the availability of "less-
burdensome alternatives" is relevant in deciding whether there is a reasonable fit between ends
and means).
128. See Discovery Network, 113 . Ct. at 1517.
129. Id. at 1515 (reasoning that an advertising restriction will be invalid if "provid[ing]
only the most limited incremental support for the interest asserted," and if "achiev[ing] only a
marginal degree of protection") (quoting Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products, 463 U.S. 60, 73
(1983) (citations omitted)). The Court also denied the city's argument that the newsrack ban is
content-neutral and is a valid time, place or manner restriction on protected speech. See id. at
1516 ("[G]ovemment may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place or manner of
engaging in protected speech provided that they are adequately justified 'without reference to
the content of the regulated speech."') (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781,
791 (1989)).
130. See supra note 122.
131. See 113 S. Ct. at 1510 n. 12 (requiring "the government goal to be substantial, and the
cost to be carefully calculated," and the government to "affirmatively establish the reasonable
fit") (quoting Fox, 492 U.S. at 480) (emphasis added).
132. Seeid at 1510.
133. See 113S. Ct. 1792.
134. See id. at 1804; see also Ibanez v. Florida Dep't of Bus. & Prof'l Regulation, 114 S.
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Although recognizing the state's substantial interest in protecting
consumers from fraud or overreaching by CPAs and in maintaining
CPAs' independent judgment, the Court found that the state failed to
prove that the ban directly and materially advanced those interests.135
Furthermore, the Edenfield court rejected the state's argument that
the ban can be justified as a prophylactic rule because the CPA
solicitation is not inherently overreaching.'36 The Court found that the
regulator provided no study or anecdotal evidence to prove the harms
of CPA solicitation and concluded that the state's concern was simply
a supposition.3 7
Similar to Discovery Network and Edenfield, the Court in Rubin v.
Coors Brewing Co.'38 required the government to produce actual
evidence, not mere "speculation or conjecture," that the regulation
directly advanced its goals and was not more extensive than
necessary. 9 While recognizing the federal government's substantial
interest in protecting the public health and safety by preventing a
competition of alcoholic strength, 4 ' the Court invalidated a federal
rule preventing beer labels from indicating alcoholic content because
the government failed to produce non-speculative evidence.' 4'
Ct. 2084 (1994) (holding that the First Amendment protects a CPA, who is also a lawyer, to use
her non-misleading credentials of CPA and CFP on her law firm stationary, business cards, and
in advertisements).
135. See 113 S. Ct. at 1801-02.
136. See id. at 1802-03 (differentiating the CPAs who are trained to be independent and
objective, rather than persuasive, from advocates such as lawyers). Cf Ohralik v. Ohio State
Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 464 (1978) (upholding Ohio's ban on in-person solicitation by
lawyers because lawyer solicitation is "inherently conducive to overreaching and other forms of
misconduct").
137. See 113 S. Ct. at 1800. The Court also noted that a report of the American Institute of
CPAs provided no empirical data supporting the state's concern. See id. at 1801.
138. 115 S. Ct. 1585 (1995).
139. Id. at 1592 (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S. Ct. at 1800). In his concurrence, Justice
Stevens urged a further extension of his majority opinion in Discovery Network that truthful and
non-misleading commercial speech should receive full First Amendment protection, as opposed
to "relying on the formulaic approach announced in Central Hudson," which he described as
"misguided." Id. at 1594-95 (Stevens, J., concurring). He also argued that a "rigid
commercial/noncommercial distinction" is artificial. Id. at 1595.
140. See id. at 1594.
141. See id. at 1593. The Court also emphasized that the beer label ban obviously deprived
consumers of important product information. See id. at 1592.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol52/iss1/19
BALANCING COMMERCIAL SPEECH
Applying the third and fourth prongs of the Central Hudson test,
the Rubin Court found that the regulatory scheme was "irrational"
because it required alcohol content disclosure of wines and spirits on
labels and did not apply in states mandating alcohol content
disclosure. 42 Noting further that the government failed to offer
convincing evidence that the ban prevented strength wars, the Court
held that the ban did not advance the asserted goal in a "direct and
material fashion."'43 Moreover, the Court stated that the ban was
more excessive than necessary because the government did not
choose alternatives that were less intrusive on brewers' First
Amendment rights, such as directly limiting the alcohol content of
beers or prohibiting advertising of high alcohol strength.'"
Notably, the Rubin court limited the famous Rehnquist
pronouncement in Posadas indicating that if government can ban an
unlawful product, it has the power to ban advertising for the
product.'45 The Rubin court noted that the pronouncement was mere
dictum, unnecessary for the decision in Posadas.' Furthermore, the
Rubin Court indicated that neither Posadas nor United States v. Edge
Broadcasting Co.'47 compelled the Court "to craft an exception to the
Central Hudson standard," giving legislatures "broader latitude to
regulate speech that promotes socially harmful activities, such as
142. See Rubin, 115 S. Ct. at 1593.
143. Id. at 1594. The Rubin Court based its conclusion on two observations particularly
relevant to the analysis of cigarette billboard advertising ban in Part IV, infra. First, no witness,
deposition, or credible evidence shows that alcohol content disclosure on labels would promote
strength wars. See id. at 1593 (citing district court's finding). Second, disseminating factual
information about alcohol content does not demonstrate that brewers intend to compete on the
basis of alcohol content. See id. However, in the cigarette advertising context, there are ample
independent studies showing that cigarette advertising promotes cigarette consumption by
teenagers, and cigarette companies intend to target the teenager market by using attractive
images in billboard advertising. See infra Part IV.B.
144. See Rubin, 115 S. Ct. at 1593-94.
145. See id. at 1589-90 n.2. Justice Rehnquist, who wrote for the majority in Posadas,
joined the Rubin majority and did not opine on the Rubin court's reading of his dictum in
Posadas. See supra note 110 (discussing Justice Rehnquist's dictum in Posadas that a power to
regulate a product includes a subordinate power to regulate its advertising).
146. See id at 1589-90 n.2.
147. 113 S. Ct. 2696 (1993) (upholding a federal ban on radio advertising of gambling by
stations located in non-lottery states).
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alcohol consumption," gambling, and the like.'48 The Rubin Court's
implicit limitation of the Rehnquist pronouncement only appears in a
footnote.149 This placement choice raises questions about the degree
to which the Court has limited Rehnquist's pronouncement in
Posadas.
While the Discovery Network line of cases discussed do not
expressly restrict judicial deference to the legislature, a principle
developed in Posadas and Fox, the cases require legislatures to
choose less burdensome means of regulating commercial advertising.
b. Edge: Higher Deference to Legislative Regulation of "Vice"
Activities Advertising
United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co.'5 represents a differing
line of rationale by the Court in the post-Fox era. Consistent with
Posadas, the Court applied a low degree of scrutiny to the regulation
of gambling advertising, which the Court designated as a "vice"
activity.15 1
In Edge, the Court upheld a federal law banning gambling
advertising by radio stations located in the non-gambling states.52
148. 115 S. Ct. at 1590 n.2.
149. See id.
150. 113 S. Ct. 2696 (1993). Edge Broadcasting Company operates a radio station in
Moyock, North Carolina, a non-lottery state. Moyock is located only three miles away from the
border with Virginia, a lottery state. Its listening audience is composed of 92.2% Virginians and
only 7.8% are residents of North Carolina. Edge derives 95% of this advertising revenue from
Virginia sources. See id. at 2702.
151. See id. at 2703 ("[The activity underlying the relevant advertising-gambling-
implicates no constitutionally protected rights; rather, it falls into a category of 'vice' activity
that could be, and frequently has been, banned altogether."). Cf 113 S. Ct. at 2710 n.3 (Stevens,
J., dissenting) ("Mhe fact that underlying conduct is not constitutionally protected increases
... the value of unfettered exchange of information across state lines. When a state has
proscribed a certain product or service, its citizens are all the more dependent on truthful
information regarding the policies and practices of other States.").
152. See 113 S. Ct. at 2708. Edge involved section 316 of the Communications Act of 1934
which bans broadcast gambling adverting, with exemptions for newspapers and broadcasters
licensed to a state that conducts a state-run lottery. See id. at 2701. The Court noted that the
exemption is to "accommodate the operation of legally authorized State-run lotteries consistent
with continued Federal protection to the policies of non-lottery States." Id. (citing, inter alia, S.
REP. NO. 93-1404, at 2 (1974)).
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The ban prevented a small portion of residents in North Carolina, a
non-gambling state, from listening to gambling advertising by a
North Carolina radio station, which is close to and has most of its
audience in Virginia, a lottery state.'53 Nevertheless, the Court held
that this gambling advertising ban serves the congressional policy of
properly balancing the interests of gambling and non-gambling
states."5 Given the importance of this balancing interest, the Court
stated that "even if... there were only [a] marginal advancement of
that interest," it would be "plainly" true that the gambling advertising
ban directly advances that interest."5 Likewise, in Rubin, the Court
suggested that the critical nature of the interest justified a greater
deference to legislative judgment, even if that judgment was only
based on common sense. 56
Although decided after Discovery Network and Edenfield during
the Court's 1992 term, Edge notably did not coordinate the different
levels of judicial deference in the Posadas-Fox analysis and the
153. Seeid at 2702.
154. See id. at 2704.
155. Id. at 2704 (emphasis added). In contrast, Discovery Network reasoned that if a
regulation offers only "the most limited incremental support" for the asserted interest, and if it
achieves only a "marginal degree of protection," such regulation is invalid. Discovery Network,
113 S. Ct. at 1515 (citing Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods., 463 U.S. 60, 73 (1983)). However, the
context in Edge is significantly different. The balancing of gambling and non-gambling states'
interests is a federalism principle and a congressional policy. In contrast, the interest involved in
Discovery Network only concerns the city's safety and aesthetics. See supra note 125 and
accompanying text (discussing Discovery Network). Therefore, the Edge Court's comment on
"marginal degree" is valid only in a very narrow context.
156. See 113 S. Ct. at 2704. The Court stated:
Congress plainly made the commonsense judgment that each North Carolina station
would have an audience in that State, even if its signal reached elsewhere and that
enforcing the statutory restriction would insulate each station's listeners from lottery
ads and hence advance the governmental purpose of supporting North Carolina's laws
against gambling.
Id. (emphasis added). See also Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 509 (1981)
(plurality opinion) (upholding a city ban on any billboard that constituted a distraction and
therefore a hazard to traffic safety, despite a claim that the record did not adequately show any
connection between billboards and traffic safety). The Court in Metromedia also stated that a
court may be satisfied by the legislative "accumulated, common-sense judgments" if "not
manifestly unreasonable." Id.
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Discovery Network-Edenfield analysis.'17 In fact, the Edge Court did
not even significantly refer to Discovery Network or Edenfield,
indicating the apparent difficulty that the Court faced in adopting a
properly balanced approach between two different lines of reasoning.
c. Florida Bar: Toward A More Balanced Approach
Florida Bar v. Went for It, Inc.,'"5 the last commercial speech case
concluding the Court's 1995 term, modified the high degree of
scrutiny in Rubin. 9 In Florida Bar, the Court endeavored to develop
a more balanced approach by coordinating its differing opinions after
Central Hudson."3
In Florida Bar, the Court upheld a state ethical rule prohibiting
lawyers from sending targeted direct-mail solicitations to accident or
disaster victims and their families within thirty days following the
event. '6 The Court strongly supported Florida's substantial interests
in protecting the privacy and tranquility of personal injury victims,
their family members, and the integrity of the legal profession.'62
157. See id. at 2702-07. Cf id. at 2708 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority's
reasoning is contrary to Discovery Network and Edenfield).
158. 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995).
159. See id. Interestingly, the Court for the first time referred to a "three-part" Central
Hudson test, as opposed to a four-part test. Part one of the original test under Central Hudson
(advertising concerns unlawful activity or is misleading) became a prerequisite to the
application of this test. In addition, the others parts were renumbered as: part one, real and
substantial interest; part two, proof of "direct and material advancement"; and part three, "the
regulation must be narrowly drawn." Id. at 2375.
160. See id.
161. See id. at 2381. Justice Kennedy, who wrote for the majority in Edenfleld, delivered a
strong dissent joined by Justices Stevens, Souter and Ginsberg. See id. Justice Kennedy argued
that Florida's restriction would deprive accident victims of information critical to their claims
for compensation. See id. at 2382 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). He tried to level the playing field
for commercial speech with other traditional protected speech:
It would oversimplify to say that what we consider here is commercial speech and
nothing more, for in many instances the banned communications may be vital to the
recipients' right to petition the courts for redress of grievances. The complex nature of
expression is one reason why even so-called commercial speech has become an
essential part of the public discourse the First Amendment secures.
Id. (citing Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 770).
162. See id, at 2376. The Court distinguished Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466
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In holding that the ban was not more excessive than necessary, the
Court rejected an alternative rule that would categorize victims
according to the severity of their injuries. 163 The Court reasoned that a
ban applicable to all lawyer solicitations for a thirty-day period
addressed the difficulty of classifying victims based on their
injuries." Moreover, the Court concluded that there were no
"numerous and obvious less-burdensome alternatives" to Florida's
thirty-day restriction on solicitation.
65
On the other hand, the Court scrutinized the anecdotal record
offered by Florida as it did in Edenfield.'6 While it declined to
indicate the level of the state's burden of proof, the Court reviewed
the statistical and anecdotal data in great detail. 67 Convinced by
Florida's 106-page summary of its two-year study of lawyer direct-
mail solicitation, the Court held that the ban directly targeted a
"concrete, non-speculative" harm. 68
Furthermore, the Court stated that the "reasonable fit" standard
under Fox is neither a "least restrictive means" test, nor a "less
rigorous obstacle[] of rational basis review," evidencing its effort to
establish a more balanced approach by coordinating Fox with
(1988), which invalidated a state ban on general direct-mail solicitations by lawyers. See
Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2378. The Court noted that in Shapero the State did not seek to
justify its ban as a measure protecting privacy, and the ban broadly covered all direct-mail
solicitations, "whatever the time frame and whoever the recipient." Id; cf. id at 2382
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing that Shapero is controlling).
163. See id. at 2380.
164. See id.
165. Id (citing Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1510 n.13). However, Justice Kennedy
argued that the ban creates a "wild disproportion between the harm supposed and the speech
ban enforced." Id. at 2384 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
166. Seeid. at2377.
167. See 115 S. Ct. at 2377-78 (listing data on the irritating effect of lawyers' direct
solicitation). However, the Court went one step further in favor of regulatorS, stating that "[i]n
any event, we do not read our case law to require that empirical data [must be) accompanied by
a surfeit of background information. ... [W]e have permitted litigants to justify speech
restrictions by reference to studies and anecdotes .... Id. at 2378 (citing City of Renton v.
Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1986).
168. Id. In contrast, Justice Kennedy described the State's Summary of Record as a few
pages of self-serving and unsupported statements by the State because the document did not
indicate the sample size or selection procedure, the explanation of methodology, and the
discussion of excluded results. See id. at 2384 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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Discovery Network.' 69
III. THE ANALYSIS OF PENN ADVERTISING I AND
PENN ADVERTISING II
A. The "Logical Nexus'" Rationale in Penn Advertising I
In Penn Advertising I, the Fourth Circuit implicitly leaned toward
the Posadas and Edge interpretation of Central Hudson's
intermediate scrutiny standard.'70 Finding that the city had a
substantial public interest in avoiding teenage smoking,' the court
held that the city ban on cigarette billboard advertising reasonably fits
within such an interest.'
The court argued that the "directly advance" prong of Central
Hudson test does not concern the strict nexus inherent in the
traditional tort concept of causation.' Relying heavily on Edge and
Florida Bar and without distinguishing Discovery Network,
Edenfield, and Rubin, the court reasoned that although the
government has the burden of justifying an advertising ban, it does
not need to "canvass every conceivable situation in which some
member of the public may be affected atypically by the statute."' 74 In
particular, the court stated:
169. Id. at 2380 (citing Fox, 492 U.S. at 480, and Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1505,
1510 n.13).
170. See supra notes 103-10, 150-57 and accompanying text.
171. The Penn Advertising I court also found that the cigarette billboard advertising ban
promotes compliance with the state prohibition of the sale of cigarettes to minors and furthers
the public policy by preventing the consumption of cigarettes by minors. See Penn Advertising
1, 63 F.3d at 1325 (citing Penn Advertising of Baltimore, Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 862 F.
Supp. 1402, 1406 (D. Md. 1994)). The court found: "In the context of the current public
concern over the dangers of cigarette consumption by minors, there can be little opposition to
the assertion that the City's objective in reducing cigarette consumption by minors constitutes a
substantial public interest." Penn Advertising I, 63 F.3d at 1325.
172. See Penn-Advertising I,63 F.3d at 1326.
173. See Anheuser-Busch I, 63 F.3d at 1313. The court then stated that "the inquiry [under
Central Hudson] seeks to elicit whether it was reasonable for the legislative body to conclude
that its goal would be advanced in some material respect by the regulation." Id. (emphasis
added).
174. Anheuser-Busch 1, 63 F.3d at 1311.
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[T]he court's inquiry is limited to consideration of the
ordinance on its face against the background of the
government's objective and the prospect of the ordinance's
general effect. If it appears to the court that the legislative body
could reasonably have believed, based on data, studies, history,
or common sense, that the legislation would directly advance a
substantial governmental interest, the government's burden of
justifying it is met.'
Noting that in Edge the Supreme Court deferred to the
"commonsense judgment" of Congress that the gambling advertising
ban on radio directly advanced congressional interest,176 the court
argued that the "directly advance" test requires only a "logical nexus"
between the ends and means.'77 According to the court, the "logical
nexus" does not have to exist "in fact,"'78 but rather, it is sufficient if
it exists "on its face."'79 Under this approach, a court seemingly does
not need to inquire whether there are numerous less-burdensome
alternatives.'80 Therefore, it is quite likely that the Supreme Court
would equate the Fourth Circuit's "logical nexus" standard with the
rejected "rational basis" review. Indeed, Justice O'Connor rejected
such an "accept at face value" approach in her concurring opinion in
44 Liquormart,'8 and the Fourth Circuit has subsequently limited
such a liberal approach in Penn Advertising HI.
175. Id (citing Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2371) (emphasis added).
176. See id. at 1313-14 (citing Edge, 113 S. Ct. at 2704).
177. The Penn Advertising I court emphatically cited Anheuser-Busch I:
There is a logical nexus between the City's objective and the means it selected for
achieving that objective, and it is not necessary ... to prove conclusively that the
correlation in fact exists, or that the steps undertaken will solve the problem. If that
were required, communities could never initiate even minor steps to address their
problems, for they could never be assured of the success of their efforts. The proper
standard for approval must involve an assessment of the reasonableness of the
legislature's belief that the means it selected will advance its ends.
Penn Advertising , 63 F.3d at 1325 (citing Anheuser-Busch 1, 63 F.3d at 1314).
178. Anheuser-Busch 1, 63 F.3d at 1314.
179. Id. at 1311.
180. See id.
181. 44 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1522 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (joined by Rehnquist,
C.J., and Souter and Breyer, JJ.).
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B. Penn Advertising II Distinguishes 44 Liquormart
In May 1996, the Supreme Court remanded Penn Advertising I for
further consideration in accordance with the Supreme Court's
decision in 44 Liquormart.'82 However, finding that the Baltimore
ban is far less restrictive than Rhode Island's ban on alcoholic
beverage price advertising, the Penn Advertising 1I court readopted
the result of Penn Advertising I. '
44 Liquormart dealt with a Rhode Island ban that prohibited
"advertising in any manner whatsoever" the sale price of any
alcoholic beverages within the state, except for price signs displayed
with the beverages that are not visible from the street.' Although the
Court unanimously struck down this ban, the effect of its holding on
the commercial speech doctrine is limited because it primarily deals
with the bounds of state power in regulating liquor under the Twenty-
First Amendment. 85 In addition, the Court's decision fails to form a
majority of the Court concerning the commercial speech doctrine.'86
Although 44 Liquormart does not explicitly overrule Posadas, a
majority of Justices disagreed with Posadas' highly deferential
approach. Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and
Ginsberg, argued that "Posadas clearly erred in concluding that it
was 'up to the legislature' to choose suppression over a less speech-
restrictive policy."'87  In addition, citing Florida Bar, Rubin,
Edenfield and Discovery Network, Justice O'Connor stated that after
Posadas
[the Court] declined to accept at face value the proffered
justification for the State's regulation, but examined carefully
the relationship between the asserted goal and the speech
182. See Penn Advertising, Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 116 S. Ct 2575 (1996).
183. See Penn Advertising, Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 101 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 1996).
184. 44 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1501 (citing R.I. GEN. LAWS § 3-8-7 (1987)).
185. Seeid. at 1514-15.
186. See id. 44 Liquormart contains five separate opinions and three concurrences.
187. Id. at 1511. Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Thomas, and Ginsberg also argued that "a state
legislature does not have the broad discretion to suppress truthfiul, nonmisleading information
for paternalistic purpose. "Id.
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restriction used to reach that goal. The closer look that we have
required since Posadas comports better with the purpose of the
analysis set out in Central Hudson, by requiring the State to
show that the speech restriction directly advances its interest
and is narrowly tailored."
The Fourth Circuit in Penn Advertising II accepted these Justices'
rejection of the highly deferential approach in Posadas. In Penn
Advertising II, the Fourth Circuit made clear that in readopting its
decision in Penn Advertising I, it did not rely on Posadas 9 The
court stated:
Because we do not defer blindly to the legislative rationale, but
rather agree with it based on our own independent conclusion
about the fit between legislative objective and the regulation
used to achieve that objective, the holding in Posadas is not
necessary to our opinions upholding Baltimore City's
ordinance.' 9'
However, the court in Penn Advertising II failed to clarify the
appropriate level of scrutiny. Under a presumedly higher standard of
judicial scrutiny, the court still held that Baltimore's restriction on
cigarette billboard advertising does not violate commercial speech
rights under the First Amendment.19' The court distinguished the facts
concerning the Baltimore ordinance from the facts in 44 Liquormart
in at least three ways. First, Baltimore's ordinance expressly targets
children who cannot legally smoke cigarettes, while in 44 Liquormart
the ban of liquor price advertising targets legal users in Rhode
Island. 92 Second, and more significantly, the Baltimore ordinance
does not ban outdoor advertising of cigarettes entirely, but merely
188. Id. at 1522 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Souter and
Breyer, JJ.).
189. See Anheuser-Busch I1, 101 F.3d at 327 n.*.
190. Id.
191. See Penn Advertising l, 101 F.3dat333.
192. See Anheuser-Busch II, 101 F.3d at 329. In citing Anheuser-Busch II, this author has
changed the wording "alcoholic beverages" used in Anheuser-Busch II to "cigarette" to reflect
the situations in Penn Advertising L
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restricts the time, place, and manner of such advertising, while Rhode
Island's blanket ban prohibits liquor price advertising "in any manner
whatsoever."' 93 Third, unlike Rhode Island's desire to enforce adult
temperance, Baltimore seeks to protect children who do not have the
independent ability to assess the value of the advertising message.'94
In particular, the court in Penn Advertising II emphasized the
Supreme Court's long-standing position that "children deserve
special solicitude in the First Amendment balance because they lack
the ability to assess and analyze fully the information presented
through commercial media."' 95 As the following section will discuss,
both relevant judicial precedents and health evidence support the
Penn Advertising II court's conclusion.
IV. PROTECTION OF CHILDREN VERSUS FREEDOM OF COMMERCIAL
SPEECH
A. The Public Interest in Protecting Children Is Substantial and
Compelling
1. The Government Has a Substantial Interest in Preventing
Teenage Smoking
Tobacco smoking is dangerous and costly. Since the publication
of the 1964 Surgeon General's Report, 9 6 scientific and statistical
research has continued to show that tobacco use, the main cause of
lung cancer and heart disease, is "the leading preventable cause of
illness and premature death in the United States."' 97 In addition, the
United States health care system spent about $22 billion in treating
smoking-related disease in 1985, with related lost productivity costs
193. Id.
194. See id.
195. Anheuser-Busch 11, 101 F.3d at 329.
196. This is the first Surgeon General's Report that affirmatively linked smoking with lung
cancer and heart decease. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
197. H.R. 4972, 99th Cong. § 2 (1986). See supra note 65 (discussing the findings in the
proposed Health Protection Act of 1986).
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of $43 billion. 9'
The teenage smoking problem is serious. Although the number of
smokers in the United States is declining, the number of teenage
smokers is steadily increasing, accounting for ninety percent of new
smokers.' 9 With the reality that thirty-one percent of high school
seniors smoke, 3,000 teenagers begin smoking each day, 1,000 of
whom will eventually die of tobacco-related disease,2t ° the enormity
of the government's interest in preventing this teenage smoking
epidemic cannot be overstated.
2. The Supreme Court Traditionally Increases Protection for the
Compelling Interest of Children
Children lack analytical and judgmental development.20' Research
confirms children's inability to deal with abstract concepts 20 2 and to
distinguish between fantasy and reality. 203 Children accept the world
at face value and do not have the healthy skepticism of an adult when
viewing advertisements.2' Therefore, children are especially
susceptible to attractive and "fun" advertising images,20 5 but neither
care about nor understand facts such as price and nutritional value.20 6
Deeply concerned about the vulnerability of children, the Supreme
198. Seesupra note 65.
199. See Joseph R DiFranza et al., RJR Nabisco's Cartoon Camel Promotes Camel
Cigarettes to Children, 266 J. OF AM. MEDICAL ASS'N 3149, 3149 (1991); see also Hooked on
Tobacco. supra note 3.
200. See Roan, supra note 4.
201. See Molly Pauker, The Case for FTC Regulation of Television Advertising Directed
Toward Children, 46 BROOK. L. REV. 513, 514 (1980).
202. See id. at 515. Children have only embryonic intellectual systems that produce
"preconcepts," which are "[a]ctive and concrete, rather than schematic and abstract." Id. at 515




205. For example, one study found that "[w]hen the reality presented to children on
television is more lively, fun and satisfying than real life, television becomes an attractive haven
for children." Id. at 515 n. 14 (citing W. SCHRAMM ET AL., TELEVISION IN THE LIVES OF OUR
CHILDREN 67 (1961)).
206. See id. at 515 n.15 (citing Atkin & Heald, The Content of Children's Toy and Food
Commercials, 27 J. COM. 107, 107-14 (1977)).
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Court has traditionally treated a state's interest in protecting
children's welfare and temperance as compelling, which often
overrides other competing interests." 7 Indeed, the Court has
recognized that the successful continuation of a democratic society
depends "upon the healthy, well-rounded growth of young people
into full maturity as citizens. ' 2O8 The Court's analysis in pornography
cases offers a good example of its concern for the well-being of
children.2 9
In Ginsberg v. New York,2" ° the Court held in 1968 that a state law
banning distribution of indecent film and printed materials to minors
fell within a "state's constitutional power to regulate" the "well-being
of its children."" Even though the materials were not obscene to
adults, the restraint was justified because of the recognized
constitutional authority of parents in rearing their children and
because of the state's "independent interest" in protecting children."'
Similarly, in 1982 the Court in New York v. Ferber"'
unanimously rejected a First Amendment challenge to a state ban on
207. See infra notes 211, 215, 218-20 and accompanying text. See also FCC v. Pacifica
Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749 (1978) (recognizing the need to protect children from indecent
broadcasts); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944). But cf Globe Newspaper Co.
v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607-08 (1982) (recognizing that a compelling state interest in
the physical and psychological well-being of children does not permit mandatory exclusion of
the public from trials involving criminal sexual offenses against minors).
208. Prince, 321 U.S. at 168.
209. For a discussion of protecting children in the pornography context, see, for example,
T. Christopher Donnelly, Comment, Protection of Children from Use in Pornography: Toward
Constitutional and Enforceable Legislation, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 295, 296-304 (1979). For a
discussion of broadcasting advertising legislation and the protection of children, see, for
example, Gail E. Lees, Comment, Unsafe for Little Ears?: The Regulation of Broadcasting
Advertising to Children, 25 UCLA L. REv. 1131 (1978) and Peggy Charren, Children's
Advertising: Whose HandRocks the Cradle?, 56 U. CIN. L. REv. 1251 (1988).
210. 390 U.S. 629 (1968). For a discussion of Ginsberg, see Dabney E. Bragg, Note,
Regulation of Programming Content to Protect Children After Pacifica, 32 VAND. L. REV.
1377, 1389 (1979).
211. 390 U.S. at 639 ("The well-being of ... children is of course a subject within the
State's constitutional power to regulate... at least if it was rational for the legislature to find
that the minors' exposure to [indecent) material might be harmful.").
212. Id. at 640.
213. 458 U.S. 747 (1982). For a discussion of Ferber, see Eric L. Dauber, Note,
Constitutional Law-Child Pornography: A New Exception to the First Amendment-New
York v. Ferber, 50 U.S.L. W. 5077 (U.S. July 2, 1982), 10 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 684 (1983).
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the distribution of material depicting children engaged in sexual
conduct, even if the material was not legally obscene.214 The Court
held that because the state had a "compelling interest" in protecting
children and because the value of such speech was "de minis," the
protection of children overrode the First Amendment right of access
to pornography." 5
The Court consolidated the Ginsberg and Ferber principles in two
recent cases, Sable Communication of California, Inc. v. FCC216 and
Osborne v. Ohio.2"7 In Sable, the Court relied on Ginsberg in
upholding a federal rule prohibiting obscene interstate commercial
telephone communications."' Furthermore, "given the importance of
the State's interest in protecting [children],"21 9 the Osborne court
extended the Ferber analysis to uphold an Ohio statute prohibiting
the private possession or viewing of child pornography.22
The principle of protecting children's interests in pornography
cases is analogous to cigarette advertising bans. Both cigarette
smoking and pornography endanger "the healthy, well-rounded
growth of young people into full maturity as citizens."22
Furthermore, the restriction on these two kinds of speech similarly
affects the First Amendment rights of adults, which, according to the
Court's traditional view, should be overridden by the compelling
interest of protecting children. As previously discussed, the federal
district court in Capital Broadcasting specifically noted the broadcast
media's special accessibility to children as a reason to uphold the
federal broadcast ban on cigarette advertising.222 The Supreme Court
214. See 458 U.S. at 774.
215. Id. at 756-58, 762-63.
216. 492 U.S. 115(1989).
217. 495 U.S. 103 (1990).
218. "[T]here is a compelling interest in protecting the physical and psychological well-
being of minors. This interest extends to shielding minors from the influence of literature that is
not obscene by adult standards." Sable, 492 U.S. at 126 (citing Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 639-40;
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 756-57).
219. Osborne, 495 U.S. at 110.
220. See id. at 126,
221. Prince, 321 U.S. at 168.
222. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
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found that the ban did not violate the First Amendment.223 This
reasoning reflects the long-standing judicial emphasis on protecting
children's health and moral welfare to justify cigarette advertising
bans.224 Given the overwhelming evidence available to contemporary
courts linking cigarette advertising to teenage smoking,225 the
government's interest in protecting children from cigarette
advertising is certainly compelling.
Another analogous situation is the regulation of violence and sex
on television. 6  In February, 1996, Congress passed the
Telecommunications Reform Act to protect children from television
violence.27 This Act requires the television industry to establish
content ratings to help parents screen out unwanted programming by
using a blocking device known as the "V-chip. '2  This mandate
evidences the increasing congressional consensus on the compelling
nature of child welfare in today's sophisticated industrialized society.
B. The Baltimore Ban Directly Advances the Interest of Protecting
Children
In considering the "directly advance" prong of Central Hudson,
the Supreme Court in Rubin applied a more balanced approach and
reviewed whether the government possessed substantial evidence to
directly link the advertising and the affected interest. 229 In Penn
Advertising, the Baltimore City Council conducted public hearings
receiving an extensive range of evidence, including previously
conducted studies and various testimony that detailed the correlation
223. See supra note 36.
224. See supra note 207.
225. See supra note 4.
226. For a discussion of the regulation of TV violence and the children's interest, see, for
example, Ian M. Ballard, Jr., Note, See No Evil, Hear No Evil: Television Violence and the First
Amendment, 81 VA. L. REV. 175 (1995).
227. See Wisely, The TV Industry Moves Toward Policing Itself; New Law and Outcry on
Sex and Violence May Spur Change, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1996, at B4.
228. See id. The 1996 Act gives the TV industry a year to design a rating system, and if
not, the Federal Communications Commission will form a panel to do the job. See id.
229. See supra note 139.
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between cigarette advertising and smoking by minors.23° The
Supreme Court, were it reviewing the case, would likely find that
Baltimore has met its burden of proving a reasonable fit between the
means and the ends because of the substantial evidence linking
cigarette billboard advertising to teenage smoking.
The glamorous or independent appearance of many cigarette
advertising characters fits perfectly with teenagers' desire for fim,
romance, and independence."n One of the most widely known
cigarette cartoon characters is Joe Camel, designed by RJR Nabisco.
Joe Camel, portrayed as a "smooth character" in advertisements,
depicts a playful, humorous, and romantic image, visually linking
smoking with convivial outings.23 A comprehensive study published
in the Journal of American Medical Association ("JAMA Research")
shows a marked difference in attitude about Joe Camel among
teenagers and adults: About ninety-three percent of high school
students know the cigarette brand, as opposed to about fifty-eight
percent of adults; about forty-three percent of students think the
character is "cool," as opposed to only about twenty-six percent of
adults.233
230. SeePenn Advertisingl, 63 F,3d at 1321.
231. See supra notes 201-06 and accompanying text (discussing the characteristics of
children's judgmental ability). See also Hooked on Tobacco, supra note 3.
232, For example, one cartoon picture shows Joe Camel playing a game of billiards with a
charming young lady while smoking, and another picture shows a playful Joe Camel partying
with several other masked Joe Camels. See Difranza, supra note 199, at 3150.
233, See DiFranza, supra note 199, at 3151. The comparison of teenager and adult
responses to the Old Joe Camel character advertisements shows as following:
Total Students (%) Total Adults (%)
Have seen Old Joe 97.7 72.2
Know product 97.5 67.0
Know brand 93.6 57.7
Think ads look cool 58.0 39.9
Ads are interesting 73.6 55.1
Like Joe as friend 35.0 14.4
Think Joe is cool 43.0 25.7
Smoke Camel 33.0 8.7
Id. This survey by Dr. DiFranza and six other researchers covered five states (Georgia,
Massachusetts, Nebraska, New Mexico and Washington) representing five regions of the
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Furthermore, the use of attractive advertising images has
substantially increased brand shares in the teenage cigarette market.
The JAMA Research shows that in 1986, before Joe Camel existed,
Camel's share in the illegal child market was merely 0.5 percent.234
Five years later, Camel boasted a record share of 32.8 percent of the
illegal child market.235
A separate 1991 study which focused on child smoking in
California confirmed the JAMA Research conclusion that cigarette
advertising has effectively targeted children.236 Moreover, the
cigarette industry itself admitted its desire to "learn how smoking
begins." 7 Aware of the suggestive power of playful billboard images
on children, some advertising companies, such as 3M Media, have
decided to eliminate tobacco advertisements from their billboards.
238
Therefore, the evidence demonstrates a direct link between
nation. See id,
234. Seeid. at3151.
235. See DiFranza, supra note 199, at 3151. The JAMA Research concluded:
Old Joe Camel cartoon advertisements are far more successful at marketing Camel
cigarettes to children than to adults. This finding is consistent with tobacco industry
documents that indicate that a major function of tobacco advertising is to promote and
maintain tobacco addiction among children.
Id. at 3149.
236. John P. Pierce et al., Does Tobacco Advertising Target Young People to Start
Smoking?; Evidencefrom California, 266 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 3154 (1991). Dr. Pierce and other
researchers found that teenagers most often buy Marlboro and Camel cigarettes. Marlboro's
market share of young smokers increased until age 24 and then decreased gradually with age;
Camel's market share, however, decreased abruptly with age. See id. Dr. Pierce and his
colleagues concluded:
Perception of Advertising is higher among young smokers; market-share patterns
across age and sex groups follow the perceived advertising patterns; and changes in
market share resulting from advertising occur mainly in younger smokers. Cigarette
advertising encourages youth to smoke and should be banned.
Id.
237. DiFranza, supra note 199, at3152.
238. 3M Media, Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Company's outdoor advertising unit,
one the largest billboard advertising companies in the United States, decided to eliminate
tobacco billboard advertising by the end of 1998 because of the "public perception of tobacco."
End to Tobacco Billboards, WALL ST. J., May 3, 1996, at B12. President Clinton praised 3M
Media "for accepting responsibility for the impact billboards have," and stated that "[w]e must
all work together to protect our children from the lures of tobacco." Id.
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aggressive cigarette advertising and the significant increase in
teenage smoking. The findings of independent research rebut the
tobacco industry's assertions that cigarette advertising is intended to
persuade smokers to switch brands, and that the main causes of
teenage smoking are peer pressure and family influence. These
assertions contradict the tobacco industry's own traditional policy of
"preferentially placing selected advertisements where children are
most likely to see them. 239
The Supreme Court would reach the same conclusion in Penn
Advertising as it did in Florida Bar,24° holding that a state may satisfy
its burden of proof by introducing a detailed survey about the effect
of cigarette advertising on teenage smoking. Moreover, Discovery
Network, Edenfield, and Rubin are distinguishable from Penn
Advertising. In Rubin, for example, the government failed to conduct
a study or to offer any concrete evidence indicating that the
disclosure of alcohol content on beer labels would lead to strength
wars. " Instead, the government offered only inferential arguments
based on speculation and conjecture. 242
C. The Baltimore Ban Is Not More Extensive Than Necessary
The Baltimore city ordinance provides only a limited ban on
cigarette advertising.243 The city limited its ban to billboards in
"publicly visible places" where children typically go, such as where
they live, attend school and church, and play.2" In addition, the ban
239. DiFranzasupra note 199, at3151.
240. Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at2377.
241. See supra note 143.
242. See supra note 141. See also supra note 132 and accompanying text (discussing
Discovery Network where the Court noted that the city relied on an outdated city ordinance and
did not study the new development of newsrack advertising business); supra note 137 and
accompanying text (discussing Edenfield where the Court found that no studies or anecdotal
evidence supported the state's supposition about the dangers of personal solicitation by CPAs in
a business context).
243. See supra note 16 for the content of the Baltimore city ordinance.
244. Penn Advertising of Baltimore, Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 862 F. Supp. 1402, 1414
(D. Md. 1994). In contrast to the limited scope of cigarette billboard advertising ban in
Baltimore, the Canadian Government proposed a complete tobacco advertising ban. See Bob
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would not apply to cigarette advertising on buses, taxicabs,
commercial vehicles used to transport cigarettes, or signs at
businesses licensed to sell cigarettes.245
In applying intermediate scrutiny to determine whether the
regulation is narrowly drawn, the Court does not require the
regulation to be the least restrictive means, absent numerous less-
burdensome alternatives.246 Because the Baltimore ban applies only to
limited places and to a limited medium (billboards), it should survive
the "not more extensive than necessary" test.247 In addition, Rubin is
distinguishable from the Baltimore ordinance. In Rubin, the ban of
alcohol content disclosure on labels achieved the interest of
preventing strength wars only by a "marginal degree," and there were
numerous less-burdensome measures that the government could have
taken, such as a limiting the alcohol content of beer or banning the
advertisement of alcoholic strength.248 However, the alluring
billboard advertising in public places frequented by children is a
leading cause of teenage smoking.249 A restriction on this type of
advertising substantially achieves the asserted interest of protecting
children's welfare.
CONCLUSION
Since the emergence of the Central Hudson four-prong test, the
Court has failed to develop a bright line rule for interpreting the
perimeter of the test-especially the "directly advance" and "not
Geiger, Focus on the Tobacco Industry: Tightening Up, ATLANTA CONST., Jan. 3, 1996, at 4A.
The Canadian Supreme Court overturned this proposed ban in September 1995, stating that the
ban was overbroad because regulators had failed to show the reason that a partial ban would not
be as effective. See id. For a detailed discussion of the Canadian Supreme Court ruling, see
Jeffrey S. Edelstein, New Limitations on Commercial Speech, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 20, 1995, at 3.
245. See Penn Advertising I, 63 F.3d at 1324.
246. See id. at 1325.
247. In Florida Bar, the Court upheld the prohibition of direct mail lawyer solicitation
within 30 days after an accident because there are sufficient alternative means to receive
information about the availability of legal representation, such as advertising in media,
billboard, yellow pages, and untargeted solicitation. See Rubin, 115 S. Ct. at 2380-81. Similarly,
the Baltimore ban should be upheld because it is limited and is narrowly drawn.
248. Rubin, 115 S. Ct. at 1592-93.
249. See supra note 3.
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more excessive than necessary" prongs. In spite of such ambiguity,
the plurality opinion in 44 Liquormart indicates that the highly
deferential approach in Posadas is losing its validity, and that the
Court will impose close judicial scrutiny on legislative action
regulating commercial speech.
The Penn Advertising I court proposed a "logical nexus" standard,
which would give great deference to the government. Such deference
would improperly tilt the balance between commercial speech and
regulatory interests. The Penn Advertising 11 opinion, however,
indicates that the Fourth Circuit has abandoned such a low-threshold
standard.
In addition, the Fourth Circuit in Penn Advertising II concluded
that even under closer scrutiny, the Baltimore ordinance restricting
the billboard advertising of cigarettes does not violate the First
Amendment. This conclusion is meritorious. First, the interest of
avoiding teenage smoking is not only substantial, but also
compelling. Second, the ban directly advances the state interest in
preventing teenage smoking because cigarette advertising has played
a key role in increasing teenage smoking." Third, the ban is not
more extensive than necessary because it is limited in terms of
locations and medium and does not deprive adults of their right to
receive market information about cigarettes from billboards in other
locations and from other forms of advertising.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has traditionally increased the
level of protection for children, whose compelling interest may
override other competing interests.25 Therefore, when balancing the
children's interests against the First Amendment right of cigarette
advertising for the first time, the Court will likely continue to confer
a special protection to children and uphold the constitutionality of the
cigarette advertising ban in Baltimore.
Yabo Lin*
250. See supra note 3.
251. See supra note 207.
* 1D. 1997, Washington University. The author would like to dedicate this Note to his
beloved wife Hongmei, whose support has made this Note possible.
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